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When we set about creating the journal a significant factor in favour of an online 
format was the ability to be responsive in a rapidly changing multi-disciplinary field.  
That way we could be particularly ‘cutting edge’ and perhaps even the first outlet to 
provide the space for a quality discussion and analysis on a given topical subject.  
This illustrates a somewhat clear relation between speed, production and competition.  
This is important in the field in which we research given the often heard criticism of 
commentary and regulation lagging behind science.  However the confluence of 
speed, production and competition is also present in the very science we are interested 
in and recent events would urge caution against unreflected mimicry.   
 
In Arthur Caplan and Glenn McGee’s recent column (see http://blog.bioethics.net/) 
they argue that Science must slow its speed. In particular they make reference to the 
recent controversy over Korean cloning and stem cell scientist Hwang Woo Suk.  
Here it seems he raced ahead to try and gain a competitive advantage in the field of 
stem cell research cognisant of the prohibitive nature of the US regulatory 
environment.  Unfortunately both ethics and science appear to have suffered. As 
Caplan and McGee put it: “They ran to get ahead of the world competition. Now it 
seems they ran so fast they fell down”.  The danger may be that stem sell research 
suffers generally. SCR is unlikely to have any immediate benefits and so a measured 
co-operative approach would surely be the  best way to see if it can deliver upon its 
myriad of promises from radical solutions to human diseases to reductions in animal 
experimentation.  
 
Similarly there is virtue in a slower reflective position in bioethics and social studies 
of science and technology.  In being responsive to rapid developments we would do 
well not to fall into the same trap of quality being compromised by competitiveness or 
the simple reproduction of naïve scientism that uncritically becomes ensconced in 
overly optimistic discourses of breakthrough and progress.  This we hope will guide 
us in our relevance to present and future issues so that we can exploit the speed of 
online delivery and production without running so fast we fall down.  Measured 
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In discussions on genetic engineering and plant breeding, the intrinsic value of plants 
and crops is used as an argument against this technology. This paper focuses on the 
new field of plant genomics, which, according to some, is almost the same as genetic 
engineering. This raises the question whether the intrinsic value of plants could also 
be used as an argument against plant genomics. We will discuss three reasons why 
plant genomics could violate the intrinsic value of plants: 1. genomics is part of 
biotechnology; 2. genomics equals genetic engineering; 3. plant genomics may 
enhance trends that lead to the instrumentalization of plants. We will conclude that in 
the biotic view the intrinsic value of plants is violated by plant genomics only in case 




Intrinsic value refers to the qualities of life, freedom and health1. During the last 
agricultural crisis’s involving animals in Europe, like BSE and pig diseases, many 
groups in society criticised the policy of the government and the EU using their own 
version of intrinsic value. The concept is now also applied in discussions on the 
genetic modification of plants, where it is invoked to criticize modern biotechnology. 
For example, the adherents of organic agriculture2 consider the introduction of 
transgenetic material in a plant as a violation of its intrinsic value. 
 
In contrast to modern biotechnology, the new interdisciplinary field of genomics is not 
concerned with single genes but with the whole genome. Plant genomics offers tools, 
like marker assisted breeding, that may be used by classical breeding, organic 
breeding and modern biotechnology alike. Nevertheless some groups claim that plant 
genomics is almost identical to genetic engineering3. Does plant genomics, as the 
switch to the whole genome (what could be considered a holistic view on the 
molecular level), influence the intrinsic value of plants? 
 
1.  Intrinsic value 
 
The concept of intrinsic value, formerly strictly reserved for humans, is only recently 
well established in animal ethics. The concept means that animals have an ethical 
status, a value of their own, independent of the instrumental value for humans. In the 
Netherlands the concept of intrinsic value is even incorporated in the law on the 
protection of animals. Without the intrinsic value of nature environmental ethics 
becomes a particular application of human-to- human ethics4. In this traditional kind 
of ethics the term ‘intrinsic value’ is used to refer to certain conscious experiences of 
humans, and is thus anthropocentric5. In this view there is a central difference 
between humans and non-humans: only humans have moral relevance. Everything 
else has instrumental value. It is a situation of us against them. In traditional ethics 
agriculture is morally sound, and thus also plant genomics. It cannot interfere with the 
intrinsic value of plants because they have no moral standing. 
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According to Bryan Norton6 this traditional ethic works so well that we do not need a 
distinct, non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. He argues that the interests of 
people in all the diverse services that nature provides are quite enough to support 
nature protection. But what happens to species which are not of any service, or that 
run against the interests of people? Norton offers lots of other reasons why these 
species have to be protected anyhow.  He concludes that a non-anthropocentric 
environmental ethic is simply redundant. Against this position Warwick Fox7 argues 
that it makes a huge practical difference when we grant intrinsic value to nature. In 
that case the burden of proof would shift from the conservationists to the people who 
are destroying nature. People would have to go to court seeking permission, for 
example, to fell trees.  As a consequence people would also have to seek permission to 
perform all kinds of agricultural activities like cutting grass or leaves or other plant 
material.  
 
With the rise of environmental ethics at the end of the sixties the term intrinsic value 
was also applied to the so called ‘higher’ animals that also have a conscious 
awareness because they can experience pain. The claim that nature has intrinsic value 
is the cornerstone of environmental ethics. In the terminology of Henk Verhoog8 this 
second step in the development of the concept of intrinsic value is called zoo centric 
ethics because humans only need to show respect to sentient animals. Verhoog argues 
that in the zoo-centric approach concepts developed in the anthropocentric tradition 
are extended to those animals that are closest to humans. In the zoo-centric view 
traditional animal husbandry violates the intrinsic value of animals, but it is also in 
this view impossible for plant genomics to violate the intrinsic value of plants because 
plants are not sentient animals. The third step in the development of the concept of 
intrinsic value, the bio-centric view, is an enlargement of the domain of intrinsic value 
to all living beings. In the biotic view intrinsic value is an absolute value, without 
degrees, and not connected to subjective human experience. This means that all 
activities of traditional agriculture violate the intrinsic value of all living beings in 
those activities.  Does the biotic view also mean that plant genomics violates the 
intrinsic value of plants? 
 
2.  Plant Genomics 
 
In the Dutch research setting, genomics is defined as ‘research by means of large-
scale characterization of genes and gene products into the elucidation of the way 
genes, RNA, proteins and metabolites interact in the functioning of cells, tissues, 
organs and the complete organism and its environment, both in an individual or in 
populations of species, as well as between species’9. The most distinguishing issue in 
the Dutch definition is ‘by means of large-scale characterization’. A large-scale 
characterization, implicitly combined with a high or reasonable speed, places the 
notion of ‘high-throughput technologies’ at the heart of genomics research. The large-
scale approach also motivates the further development of bio-informatics as a means 
to store, analyze and interpret the large amounts of data generated. By this 
combination with information science, genomics may and will help to move biology 
from in vivo to in silico. The ultimate and highly ambitious goal of genomics is 
knowledge and use of ‘all’: the identification and structure of ‘all’ genes, ‘all’ gene 
products and 'all' molecules and ‘all’ their interactions in ‘all’ parts of ‘all’ organisms 
during ‘all’ life spans in ‘all’ environments10.  
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Genomics researchers11 promise or claim to revolutionize biology and transform 
biological science from a largely descriptive activity into an information science12. In 
a combination of genetics and information technology, genomics will explore and 
exploit gene functions in living systems13. The knowledge that stems from genomics 
is thought to be useful in addressing the so-called problems of our time, such as 
pollution, disease and food supply. This knowledge could trigger further 
improvements in diagnosis, prevention and agronomic practice. Agricultural genomics 
may reveal what genes or combinations of genes do in plants and livestock. As 
genomics compiles a complete list of genes and what each of them does, the 
predictive power of genetic constitution on performance could increase. In this way 
genomics promises to have a major impact on our understanding of plant performance 
and also on the relevance of genes for that performance. This would help to identify in 
plants and livestock the variations that have high value. This could make plant 
breeding more efficient, but will also allow breeders to evaluate biodiversity within 
crops, gene banks and other stocks in a better way. Genomics could make crop 
growing more local and effective, as well as encourage growth of plants with 
combinations of genes/characters that suit the needs of farmers and farming 
communities.  
 
Genomics of plant pathogens may identify the causes of plant diseases and indicate 
new ways of fighting them. Moreover, it can suggest strategies for minimizing the 
likelihood that resistance develops. Since it can show how pest organisms resist 
existing treatments, it may suggest new targets for novel pest management and the 
industrial manufacturing of such compounds. Crops that have an increased disease 
resistance reduce environmental impact and farming costs. Genomics will prevent 
pollution by reducing the use of pesticides and weed-killers in agriculture, and it may 
stimulate the use of plants in the cleaning up of soils contaminated with heavy metals 
or other undesired compounds14.  
 
From a positivistic perspective, high-throughput technology-based genomics could be 
considered the ultimate culmination of the reductionist approach to biology: an 
explanation of life solely in terms of interactions of genes and molecules15. The 
explanation of biological processes in molecular terms, which are in turn reducible to 
chemistry and physics, would be the ultimate reduction. It is therefore interesting that 
in the view of some, genomics will allow for  a reconstitution and focus on the 
organism as a whole (and population and ecosystem) and bring ‘holism’ back into 
biology16. 
 
3. Intrinsic value and plant genomics 
 
In the biotic view, plants, as living beings, have intrinsic value. We will discuss three 
reasons why plant genomics could violate the intrinsic value of plants: 1. genomics is 
part of biotechnology; 2. genomics equals genetic engineering; 3. plant genomics may 
enhance trends that lead to the instrumentalization of plants. 
 
Biotechnology can be defined as 'the science and technology aimed at understanding 
and using living organisms or parts thereof to improve the organism for specific 
human uses or to make or modify a product'17. In this setting, many human activities 
should be considered part of the realm of biotechnology, and, because human use is 
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central in these activities, they would not be in accord with the biotic view. Genomics 
is or will become an important component of 'modern' biotechnology. Some feel that 
it is particularly special and will lift biotechnology to a new level; others feel that it 
should perhaps not even be considered part of biotechnology. In the latter case the 
arguments of the biotic view against genetic engineering do not apply to plant 
genomics. Apparently, terminology is used highly interchangeably, which may be 
taken as an indication that genomics is still a relatively young field of science18.  
 
For some people genomics is the same as genetic engineering. This ‘genomics equals 
genetic engineering scenario’ is far from hypothetical. Both genomics and genetic 
engineering deal with genes, genetic material and improvements of plants. The 
distinction is a subtle one at most, which is easily forgotten or miscommunicated. The 
term 'genomics' may turn out to be a poor one19. The violation of the intrinsic value of 
plants is often used as an important argument against genetic engineering of plants. It 
is argued that genetic modification leads to an instrumentalization of plants. 
Transgenetic plants are manufactured solely for the purpose of use by humans. The 
consequentialist version of the biotic view does not oppose genetic engineering as 
such, as a morally objectionable technique, but objects to the consequences of genetic 
engineering20. According to Visser21 the questions to ask about genetic engineering 
are: do transgenic plants have a life that unfolds according their nature?  Is life devoid 
of human interference in the interest of plants? Transferring these questions to plant 
genomics, the main question is: does the use of plant genomics interfere with plant 
life in a measure that their fundamental rights are violated?  
 
Many scientists will answer this question by stating that the concepts of genomics and 
genetic engineering are neither synonymous, nor mutually exclusive. Agricultural 
genomics will point to genes (and phenotypes) in crop plants that could be used in the 
improvement of the organism or its associated agronomy for specific human uses. 
This improvement can be achieved through marker-assisted selection. This is an 
anthropocentric outlook, something that is part of agriculture in general. The 
improvements could also be put into action through genetic engineering. In genomics, 
genetic engineering is likely to be of help in answering research questions. The 
function of a plant gene may be easier studied in microbes or model plants in order to 
understand better what it does. However, application of such knowledge does not 
imply by definition the use of genetic engineering in plant improvement. In addition, 
the availability of funds for genomics research is a motivation to pursue the 
approaches thought to be specific for genomics. Genomics could, or is expected to, 
generate knowledge of plants that would allow obtaining desired improvements 
without the need for genetic engineering. In that case genomics is helping to maintain 
the intrinsic value of plants from the perspective of the biotic view. In the public 
perception, however, the relationship between agricultural genomics and plant genetic 
engineering seems much less clear. This is one of the reasons why some research 
programmes in plant genomics already gave priority to applications without genetic 
engineering22.  
 
Agricultural genomics will have to face all the societal concerns associated with 
agricultural biotechnology in general, such as (over?) regulation, corporate control, 
ownership, distribution of profit and benefits, and safety. An important societal 
concern for agricultural genomics, even when excluding genetic engineering, may be 
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certain aspects of regulation. The level of regulatory scrutiny currently imposed on a 
genetically engineered crop is high and unprecedented for any product of plant 
breeding. Development and costs of such regulatory requirements may have 
significantly negative impacts on agricultural genomics. Alternatively, when 
agricultural genomics ends up in the hands of a few, very large, life sciences 
companies, these companies could consider regulation as a protective measure for 
their markets and market share. In this way, companies at the forefront of genomics 
innovations could be tempted to use regulation as a strategy to do away with potential 
competitors. Such developments may have equally negative impacts on future 
agricultural genomics. Agricultural genomics is a costly enterprise. High throughput 
technologies may make a single data point relatively cheap; total costs are 
considerable, due to the sheer numbers involved. Private investments far outweigh 
public funds, supported by mergers and continuous scale-up of life science 
companies. This implies that a few companies may decide over genomics research 
targets and applications. The corporate control of biotechnology in general, and future 
agricultural genomics in particular, is likely to generate considerable societal concern. 
Despite all the promises, agenda setting in genomics seems still focused on short-term 
goals. These relate to conventional, high-yield industrial agriculture aimed at profit. 
 
Societal concerns about corporate control are immediately related to issues of 
ownership and intellectual property (IP). Different from plant breeding, ownership in 
agricultural genomics is based on patenting and patent protection. Genomics research 
is seen as economic investment that requires return. It seems likely that the patenting 
frenzy of agricultural biotechnology will continue in agricultural genomics23. This 
will raise concerns about the equity, accessibility and desirability of agricultural 
genomics and its applications, but no concerns about intrinsic value. When 
agricultural genomics is seen as a high-input, high-cost, high-protected enterprise, a 
related legitimate concern is about the benefits of such genomics for the developing 
world. The developing world will face most serious problems with food supply. This 
concern is known as ‘the genomics divide’24.  
 
Genomics can be expected to contribute to a further industrialization, economization 
and mechanization of agricultural production. From a biotic perspective that could be 
regarded as undesirable because these trends enhance the instrumentalization of 
plants, and thus violate their intrinsic value. Particular schools in plant breeding, such 
as organic farming, are still debating the acceptability of molecular markers, and 
similar discussions can be expected on the large-scale approaches of agricultural 
genomics. Moreover, any impact of agricultural genomics on a further 
industrialization of food production may trigger uncertainties about the safety of 




In general, genomics, especially when presented as a 'new' technology, will encounter 
all the suspicions any new technology is usually confronted with. It can be considered 
as a next step in the process that started with the discovery of the Laws of Genetics by 
Mendel and the double helix structure of DNA by Watson and Crick. Because plant 
genomics may be used in different kinds of agriculture, plant genomics will have to 
face all the ethical, moral, social and technical issues associated with agriculture in 
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general. Overall, there seems place and need for substantial research into the 
mechanisms of agenda setting in agricultural genomics research, the extent of 
corporate control and the diversity of society's evaluation of such issues. Policy 
makers and genomics researchers seem aware of the need to include society and the 
need to deserve a ‘license to produce’ and ‘a license to sell’, rather than to exclude 
society and go on25. 
 
It seems likely that how genomics will develop depends on the deliverables of the first 
years and technological progress in high-throughput technologies. Combined with 
mutagenesis, genomics may succeed in relieving crossing barriers and broadening the 
gene pool available for plant improvement without formally using genetic 
engineering. In society, this is likely to revive concerns about 'playing God'. 
Alternatively, the increased knowledge of plants and plant performance may 
eventually ease society's concerns about such and other changes.  
 
From the perspective of traditional ethics and the zoo-ethical view, plant genomics 
does not violate the intrinsic value of plants. In the biotic view the intrinsic value of 
plants is violated by plant genomics only in case of ‘the genomics equals genetic 
engineering scenario’. In all other cases plant genomics is as good or bad as 
traditional agriculture or organic agriculture.  
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Towards a Social Contract for Genomics:  
Property and the Public in The ‘Biotrust’ Model 
 




Large-scale genetics cohort studies that link genotypic and phenotypic information 
hold special promise for clinical medicine, but they demand long-term investment and 
enduring trust from human research participants. Currently, there are a handful of 
large-scale studies that aim to succeed where others have failed, seeking to generate 
significant private-sector investment while preserving long-term interest and trust of 
studied communities.  With project planners looking for new modes of managing such 
complex collective endeavors, the idea of using a charitable trust structure for 
genomic biobanks has received increasing scholarly and policy attention. This article 
clarifies how thorny questions around property rights, the right to withdraw from 
research, access to materials, and funding might be handled within such a charitable 





Large-scale genetics cohort studies that link genotypic and phenotypic information 
hold special promise for clinical medicine, but they demand long-term investment and 
enduring trust from human research participants.  Recent experience in the United 
States, the UK, Iceland, Estonia, and Sweden suggests that population-level genomic 
studies pose particularly difficult legal and ethical challenges.1  Indeed, many 
population genomics projects with great scientific promise have failed due to 
unanticipated controversies over the distribution of property rights, data access, risk, 
and benefits across different project interest groups – such as researchers, human 
subjects, funders, medical institutions and private sector partners.2  Currently, there 
are a handful of large-scale studies that aim to succeed where others have failed, 
seeking to generate significant private-sector investment while preserving long-term 
interest and trust of studied communities.   
 
With project planners looking for alternative governance models for genomic 
biobanks, the idea of using a charitable trust structure – as proposed in a 2003 New 
England Journal of Medicine article by Winickoff and Winickoff3 – has received 
increasing scholarly and policy attention.4  This literature has highlighted the potential 
strengths of using charitable trust law to create an ideal institutional framework, but 
has also identified potential problems that may hinder its implementation.  Addressing 
these questions directly, this article clarifies and develops this “Biotrust Model” with 
respect to key areas of implementation, including property rights, the right to 
withdraw from research, access to materials, and funding.  The Biotrust Model and its 
treatment of property interests, as explicated in this article, remains a promising 
framework for community-driven governance in many genomic contexts. 
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I.  Theoretical background: towards a new social contract for genetic biobanks 
 
As Winickoff and Winickoff have argued elsewhere, charitable trust law may be a 
useful legal and institutional tool for implementing a partnership relationship between 
biomedical researchers and research subjects in the genomic biobanking context.5  
This idea was a response to a stream of empirical work suggesting how the existing 
regime of research governance has failed to manage large genomic programs.6  These 
programs have co-emerged with new scientific approaches, new technologies, and a 
new political economy of research, all of which have helped unsettle the existing 
regime of research governance in particular ways.  These are worth reviewing.  
 
First, as others have pointed out, DNA sequencing technology and bioinformatics 
have effectively transformed human tissue into a newly decipherable source of 
personal health information that uniquely identifies individuals.  As a result, the tissue 
or blood sample has become equivalent, in privacy terms, to personal data in a 
medical record that can be digitized and shared across computer networks, and used to 
discriminate.   
 
Second, it is a characteristic of DNA that sequences are shared across family and 
ethnic groups.  This group turn carries important consequences for research ethics and 
institutional design.  Sequence data derived from one person’s sample can implicate 
close family members.7  Furthermore, research on a particular ethnic group or group 
of common geographical ancestry – such as those groups studied in the human 
haplotype projects – implicates all members of that group whether they participate 
directly in the research or not.8  This fact disrupts the pre-existing ethical paradigm of 
research subjects as distinct autonomous individuals, introducing important notions of 
group autonomy and solidarity that have emerged with force in recent population 
genomic projects.9 
 
Third, and less noted, the creation of large genomic assemblages – often incorporating 
human tissue, medical information, and genealogical information -- for unforeseen 
research protocols has distanced genomics from the paradigm of research for which 
informed consent and IRB review was specifically tailored.  In the past, research 
involving human subjects has been limited in time, and defined for a specific 
scientific study.  Expanding the time-scale and openness of research use poses 
problems for achieving meaningful informed consent.10 
 
Fourth, the new role of the private sector in these projects, and an increasing emphasis 
on property, has destabilized understandings between human research participants and 
academic researchers.  Traditionally, this relationship involved the exchange of 
altruistic donation of time, bodily tissue, and medical information from human 
subjects in return for possible biomedical progress with general benefit.11  However, 
the growing role of private industry in biomedical research and discovery has 
introduced property, profit and distributional struggles into the equation. Furthermore, 
the commodification of biological information12 has raised new controversies around 
intellectual property, rights in samples, and scientific control.13 
 
These trends make the design of an appropriate regulatory regime and institutional 
structure for genomic biobanks a novel challenge.  Together they highlight how 
genomic research is not only a complex scientific endeavor, but also a complex social 
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one.  The off-the-rack regime of bioethics will no longer suffice, and instead we must 
rethink the processes and structures through which the affected communities and the 
public may deliberate upon, constitute, and enforce a new social contract for genomic 
research. 
 
II.  The Biotrust Model: clarifying the legal and institutional structure 
 
The sustainability of large-cohort genomics will require institutional, procedural, and 
substantive legitimacy in order to secure ongoing funding, a progressive research 
program, and the willing participation of volunteer subjects over time.  Using 
traditional informed consent and expert ethical review as a foundation, the Biotrust 
Model attempts to address these novel challenges by focusing new attention on issues 
of governance, constitutional powers, control of resources, and public benefit. The 
Biotrust Model aims to create a flexible institutional space through which the social 
contract around particular projects may be negotiated, ratified, and implemented.  The 
hope is that the idea can be adapted and provide utility for new genomic projects as 
they emerge, especially projects attempting to implement innovative strategies for 
managing genomic resources for public benefit. 
 
The Biotrust Model consists of a legal structure for handling the property rights and 
management of donated genetic and informational resources, and a social structure 
aimed at bolstering community participation, representation and trust in genomic 
governance – necessary conditions for sustainable collaborations.  Because there has 
been some confusion and misstatement of how this model could operate, we believe it 
would be useful to clarify the model and respond directly to productive criticisms that 
have emerged regarding its operation.  
 
The core idea of the Biotrust Model is to use the charitable trust as a legal framework 
to manage genomic resources and to govern genomic research more justly.14  A trust is 
a formal legal institution in which a property interest is held by one person or set of 
persons (the trustees) at the request of another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third 
party (the beneficiary).15  The property interest is conveyed to the trustee in a trust 
instrument that must clearly express the wish to create a trust. The settlor appoints a 
trustee of the property, who has legal fiduciary duties to keep or use the property for 
the beneficiary, creating a unique protective regime of trust law for safeguarding the 
interests of donors and other beneficiaries.16  The creation of a trust establishes a 
fiduciary relationship in which a trustee holds title to property, subject to an equitable 
obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of the beneficiary.17   
 
To be classified as a charitable trust, the purpose must be “charitable” and aim at the 
public good.18  Courts have defined “charitable” broadly in order to encourage 
“experiments to which it would be improper to devote the public funds or that the 
public would be unwilling to support until convinced by proof of their success.”19  
Allocating benefits of the trust to specific groups rather than general public might be 
desired in certain biobanking situations because of the composition of the donor 
group, because of some heightened need of a particular segment of the public, or 
because research results may be relevant only to a small section of the public.  
Directing benefit to certain segments of the public would not jeopardize charitable 
status of a trust.  In fact, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, the charitable 
classification of trusts requires that the purpose involve benefiting a class of persons 
and not simply the community at large.20  
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The charitable trust model combines a series of individual trust instruments, in which 
donors give certain property interests to the same trustee, the Biotrust Foundation, a 
non-profit organization that holds and manages the biorepository in accordance with 
the stated charitable purpose.  The charitable trust structure would put a legally 
binding fiduciary obligation on the trustee to faithfully manage the resource according 
to the charitable purpose and the public benefit defined in the trust instrument.  This 
fiduciary duty forbids trustees from self-dealing with the trust assets, engaging in 
conflict of interest transactions, and entering into transactions adverse to the trust.21  
The Biotrust Foundation would be managed according to its by-laws, which the 
donors would also agree to, and which define the charitable purpose and the terms of 
public benefit.  Procedural details could be changed according to the needs of the 
foundation’s goals, by amending its by-laws.  
 
The Biotrust Model adds important governance mechanisms to this basic charitable 
trust framework.  In this model, the by-laws would specify that use of the trust 
property would be contingent on review and approval of two bodies, the Ethical 
Review Committee (ERC) and the Donor Advisory Committee (DAC).22  The ERC of 
the biorepository would provide peer review and ethical analysis of research protocols 
that call for access to biobank materials. This committee would be roughly equivalent 
to an Institutional Review Board (IRB), except that it would be more directly 
responsive to the collective interests of the donor group.  Ideally, it would involve a 
significant number of donors so as to be more representative of the research subject 
population than current regulations require, at least in the United States.23 
 
The Donor Advisory Committee would be a body composed of direct representatives 
of the donor group, and this group would help assure that the public value of the 
collected charitable donations would be maximized.  This body would approve 
research protocols, but would also serve as a conduit between the donor group, the 
trustees, and the researchers in order to address controversial projects or issues as they 
arise.  The DAC would provide an important democratic element to the governance of 
the trust, but is envisioned also as a flexible mechanism through which 
communication and learning could take place among the biobank constituents.  In the 
United States, a similar body has emerged out of the Framingham Heart Study in 
Massachusetts, an ongoing study of fifty years in which the subject group has taken an 
interest and role in project decision-making.24  These representative could be elected 
periodically through proxy voting, in a process akin to the election of board members 
by shareholders of a corporation. 
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III.  Response to criticisms  
 
Critics in Europe and the UK have highlighted certain advantages of this model.  
First, it respects the altruistic intent of donors, while ensuring that their goodwill is 
not exploited.  Second, it imposes a duty on the resource managers to make the 
resource productive.  Third, fiduciary law addresses a power imbalance between the 
settlor/beneficiaries and the trustee, in contrast to the consent model, which has often 
been criticized for failing to take into account the power imbalance between doctor 
and patient.25  Fourth, the separation of storage and usage reduces the conflicts of 
interest in making prioritization decisions about the resource, enhances the 
opportunity for ethical review, and encourages interest groups to participate in 
decision-making.26  Fifth, the procedural mechanisms and structures are likely to help 
mediate among diverse interests implicated by the research.  Other advantages in 
terms of transparency, donor representation, autonomy, and scientific utility are 
discussed in the original article, and need not be rehearsed here.27 
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Recent scholarship has also raised important concerns with the legal architecture of 
the charitable trust model.  This criticism, especially that of Boggio,28 has been 
helpful as an analytical spur towards better specifying and clarifying how the model 
could be useful.  Here we discuss the significant issues for genomic governance raised 
by Boggio and others, and explain how the charitable trust model could be designed to 
resolve them. 
 
A.  Property rights of biological samples 
 
One concern Boggio raises is that the charitable trust idea fails to answer important 
questions concerning ownership of tissue samples, derived data, and the database 
itself.  Boggio notes that “property in the body” is ethically controversial and legally 
inadmissible in certain jurisdictions, and this might make the model incompatible with 
many legal systems to the extent that it requires a formal recognition of property in 
the body. The question of ownership of samples is a thorny one, and it is important to 
clarify why establishing the charitable trust would violate neither the spirit nor the 
letter of this prohibition. 
 
As a threshold issue, it should be pointed out that the charitable trust model does not 
require the formal recognition of “property in the body,” at least not as that phrase is 
normally understood. The rejection of “property in the body” in certain jurisdictions 
limits the free alienability of bodily entities integral to personhood, and is based on 
the visceral and ethical disdain for commodification of the human body.29   However, 
recognizing the existence of property-like interests in human tissue is not tantamount 
to endorsing a full spectrum of alienable property rights, for example the right to sell 
tissue at any time for cash compensation. As one commentator has put it, 
 
. . . the equation of any property right with the full spectrum results 
in the erroneous impression that recognizing the existence of 
property rights in human tissue is tantamount to endorsing a right to 
sell any body party, at any time, for cash compensation . . . . A richer 
and more complete understanding of property rights, however, 
emphasizes the tremendous variety of possible property regimes in 
human biological materials.  Property is a flexible concept, not an 
all-or-nothing one.30 
 
The creation of a charitable trust would not require a general property right in the 
body, but something much narrower: the recognition that personal rights of control, 
and use, and access in pieces that can be extracted without harm (indisputably held by 
the person prior to donation) may form the basis of a legal trust.31  
 
In fact, the charitable trust is a legal tool for effecting this norm of non-
commodification.  The structure relies on the recognition of a property-like interest in 
donated materials only for the narrow purposes of creating an enforceable trust 
relationship, one that embeds control of tissue in a managed network of non-
commodity exchange: samples must be used according to the terms of the trust, and 
the trustee enforces this use.  Furthermore, the donor retains some control over the use 
of the donation because she can withdraw according to the trust agreement.  Using a 
revocable trust relationship actually ensures that donors retain an equitable interest in 
their donation, suggesting a sort of joint control with the trust (see below).32  This 
joint control of the donation does not defeat the ability to create a trust.  Here the land 
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analogy helps: a person can give a mortgaged property to be held in trust even though 
they do not own a complete inalienable right to that property. 
 
Within some jurisdictions, such as the United States, body parts are already 
understood as subject to “property interests” or “quasi-property” in certain contexts, 
especially where the bodily materials are not integral to the person’s health and 
functioning.33  The idea of a limited or quasi-property right actually comports with the 
WHO Regional Office report that Boggio cites, recommending that participants in 
biomedical research should have the “primary control [of] samples or the information 
generates from them,” and that their legal interest “is akin to a property right.”34  In 
these jurisdictions, all that is required to create a trust is that donors transfer these 
rights to the charitable trust.  
 
Boggio is also concerned that the charitable trust model is in conflict with policies 
that provide that the donation of the tissue sample does not transfer property in the 
sample to the recipient, noting that the “Icelandic Acts on Biobanks explicitly 
provides that the biobanker is not to be considered the owner of the biological 
sample.”35  We would like to draw a distinction between ownership, which suggests 
the full and undivided bundle of rights associated with property, and possessing 
certain property interests.  As Harvard property scholar Joseph Singer puts it, “the 
core image of ownership is ownership of a home.  The core conception is the notion 
of absolute control; ownership is the ability to do what you like with your own, 
without having to account to anyone else for your actions.”36  If ownership implies 
absolute control and complete freedom to use, access, sell without account to others, 
than the trustees can’t be said to “own” the samples under the charitable trust model.  
We imagine a so-called “donor-advised trust,” in which the materials are actually co-
managed by donors, trustees, and the sitting ethics board in accordance to the 
charitable intent of the donors.  In this sense, the trustee actively holds many of the 
traditional “sticks” in the bundle of rights associated with property except the right to 
sell freely. These include rights granting access, use, and control, but only for certain 
limited purposes set out in the trust purpose and by-laws.  Furthermore, the donors 
retain the ability to enforce those limitations through participatory governance and the 
right to revoke the gift.37  Thus, this system is specifically designed to address the 
ethical, legal and social problems associated with the free alienation of bodily 
materials: instead of allowing donated materials to disappear into the unaccountable 
vortex of “research” or the market exchange, the charitable trust actually 
institutionalizes the connection between body part and person.   
 
In practice, to use the “no property in the body” idea to deny research donors the 
ability to put these materials in a charitable trust would achieve the perverse result of 
facilitating their commodification.  Whether the law recognizes this fact or not, 
biological samples have become commodified in the political economy of genetics 
research.38  The Biotrust Model proposes a way to govern and regulate the exchange 
of bodily material in order to mitigate some of the concerns that are presented in 
either a system of complete ownership or complete lack of ownership.  Indeed, this 
institutional model is specifically designed to render the exchange of human research 
materials more accountable to the donors and more consistent with their charitable 
intent.   
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B.  Property rights in derived data and databases 
 
Dealing with derived data and databasing from a property perspective are less difficult 
to address.  If the charitable trust institution itself performs research and in the process 
derives data from peoples’ donations, then that data is clearly controlled by the trust 
itself, and would then have to be managed by the trustee according to the charitable 
purpose and by laws of the trust.  The database itself, if constructed by the Biotrust 
Foundation, will also be owned and controlled by the trust itself.  This accords with 
the typical treatment of data and research tools created through research.  
 
Of course, commercial entities that use donated research material to conduct research 
have a legitimate interest in the fruit of their labor.39  If the trustees decide to grant 
outside researchers or companies access to particular data or samples, and those 
research entities construct their own electronic database, ownership of this database 
would be negotiated in the licensing agreement between the trust and those 
researchers.  However, based on the charitable trust model the researchers would 
never have complete ownership of the research material.  For example, the research 
material could not be used for some alternative research that is different from the 
original research protocol approved by the trust’s Ethical Review Committee and the 
Donor Advisory Committee.  The flexible nature of the model allows the Biotrust 
Foundation’s bylaws to determine the interest that commercial entities have over the 
research material.  Therefore, the procedural details about the right for commercial 
entities to access and use research material will vary depending on the charitable goals 
and by-laws of the Biotrust Foundation. 
 
C.   Managing access to samples and information 
 
As the previous sections suggest, the Biotrust Model assigns the role of managing 
access to the board of trustees, although in our Biotrust Model they are constrained by 
the Ethical Review Committee (ERC), Donor Advisory Committee (DAC) and donor 
rights of withdrawal (described below).  This much has been discussed briefly 
elsewhere.40  Boggio correctly points out, however, that our structure does not specify 
how access to samples and sensitive data will be managed by the trustees.  He raises a 
series of questions that will help us clarify how a charitable biotrust might be 
implemented. 
 
First, Boggio notes that the charitable trust structure does not answer whether and 
how external research groups will access samples, data derived from them, and/or 
sensitive health information collected along with samples.  It is true that a charitable 
trust structure by itself does not provide an answer.  But this fact provides flexibility 
that is actually a strength of the legal structure.41  It will be up to the project 
organizers, donor group, and board of trustees to develop acceptable by-laws for the 
trust that may dictate guidelines for the degree of access.  We would suggest that these 
be negotiated before the architecture is set up, perhaps through a process of public 
consultation,42 but the by-laws could be written to permit later refinement in the 
interest of pragmatism.  These by-laws, negotiated before hand and refined later, 
should also address any principles of prioritization as between commercial and 
academic protocols, another open issue Boggio has raised. 
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If past experience is any judge, researchers in both the commercial and non-profit 
sectors will likely ask for access to biological samples, DNA sequence information, 
and any data that the charitable trust might hold.  However, recall that under our 
biotrust model, the protocol and any commercial deals would have to be approved not 
only by the trustees, but also by the ERC and the DAC.  Furthermore, access would be 
limited by any statutory or regulatory requirements.  Privacy rules and human 
research protections in many countries will likely prevent the transfer of identifiers 
along with samples and health information, at least without individual authorization.43  
 
Finally, Boggio asks whether participants would be informed if research findings 
might affect their individual care.  This is an important issue, but one that can be dealt 
with through the individual donor agreements with the trust.  In the interest of 
enhancing the autonomy of individual donors, and potential direct benefits of the 
research, we would agree with previous commentators that donors be able to indicate 
on the consent form – by checking a box – if they would like to be recontacted (so 
long as identifiers still allow it) in therapeutic situation.44  Recontact could be pursued 
through the donor’s primary care physician.  
 
Boggio states that “in the end, the trustees will be asked to make these sorts of 
judgments in adopting the policies that regulate third-party access.  Most of the 
answers will only lie in those rules governing the biobank and its contractual relations 
with external actors rather than in the governance framework.”45  While this could be 
true if the trust instrument gives trustees control, the choices of managers can be 
constrained and regulated in a number of ways.  Additionally, we have suggested a set 
of policies to help guide the thinking of project planners as they consider how they 
might accomplish different access goals through the by-laws of the trust. 
 
D.  Implementing the right of withdrawal 
 
As we have discussed elsewhere, a charitable trust in the biorepository context must 
make special accommodation for research participants, allowing them to be able to 
withdraw their samples from the biobank at any time.46  Boggio raises the question of 
whether a revocable charitable trust is able to effectuate this right of withdrawal. 
 
First, the right to withdraw one’s samples from the charitable biorepository needs to 
be distinguished from the opt-out window, another mechanism previously described 
through which the so-called “open consent” problem is mitigated.  For efficiency 
reasons, most biobanks seek an open permission from donors at a single point in time 
for future research projects instead of recontacting and reconsenting donors when new 
protocols arrive.  These so-called “open consents” pose problems for traditional 
notions of informed consent, which require that the research participant understand 
the risks and benefits of particular research protocols. Stanford University bioethicist 
Henry T. Greely and others have argued persuasively that biobanks’ requests for 
general permission should be allowed only if additional safeguards are in place.47    
 
The “opt-out window” is a mechanism that increases the autonomy of research 
subjects who give open permission, for it allows the donors to review particular 
protocols and gives them a time-limited window in which to opt-out of that particular 
protocol.   This mechanism honors the traditional norm of granting research subjects 
the right to withdraw from particular research project, while not overburdening the 
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biobank with recontact and reconsent.  Through electronic newsletters, normal mail, 
and a web site, the biotrust foundation would convey information to donors, allowing 
donors to make informed decisions about withdrawing from specific research projects 
for a short period of time before the research begins. 
 
Second, the revocable charitable trust is indeed a mechanism that could effectuate the 
right to withdraw one’s sample from the biobank at will or in cases of non-adherence 
of trustees to the charitable purpose.  A revocable trust is a trust that allows the settlor 
to revoke the trust property, according to the terms of the trust instrument.  Boggio 
states that “technically it is not a ‘revocable’ trust because in this case, the withdrawal 
of biological material of a single settler/donor does not revoke the whole trust.”48  It is 
incorrect as a matter of law that the creation of a revocable trust relationship between 
individual donors and a single trustee would require that if one donor withdraws, the 
entire biobank be revoked.  For instance, if one made a conditional donation of land to 
a charitable trust, say the National Land Trust, and the conditions were not met, the 
property would revert to the donor without interfering with trust’s other obligations.  
While legal partnerships might embody this “all-for-one-one-for-all” idea, revocable 
trusts do not.  The key conceptual point is that people donate into the existing trust, 
but under certain conditions, such that the Biotrust Foundation has individual 
revocable trust relationships with each donor. 
 
Individual revocable trust relationships are ideal for implementing the Biotrust Model 
that we advocate for biobanks. In a revocable trust the settlor maintains equitable 
rights in the trust property, though the trustee holds legal title. If a trust is not 
revocable the settlor usually has no equitable claim to enforce the terms of the trust or 
to terminate the trust.49  Most jurisdictions assume that a trust is revocable unless the 
trust instrument indicates otherwise.  
 
Another concern Boggio raises is the status of the donated material at the individual 
donor’s death.  One simple solution is for charitable biotrusts to allow for individual 
variations in the trust instruments that indicate the settlor’s desire upon death.  For 
example, settlors could indicate that they want the donation destroyed at their death or 
they could indicate that they want the sample permanently donated without any 
restriction.  
 
The trust bylaws and individual trust instruments would set the policy for withdrawal.  
As Boggio states, withdrawal might entail a number of actions, such as returning 
samples to the participants, destroying samples, anonymization, removing identifying 
information, destroying genetic data derived from the sample or simply no longer use 
them.  There are some concerns about allowing donors to withdraw from scientific 
research at any point because scientist may not want to invest in research that could 
possibly be terminated or damaged by a withdrawal.  Pragmatism requires that once a 
research project is started, the donor would not have the ability to withdraw from that 
specific study.  But at any time the donor could completely withdrawal their material 
from any future research.    
 
Creating a revocable trust ensures that donors maintain the legal rights necessary to 
withdraw their donation and enforce the duties of the trustees. In this way, the 
revocable status of donations helps advance the representation, deliberation, and 
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accountability of researchers to the donors, which is appropriate in research using 
biological material and information.   
 
E.   Funding 
 
As stated in previous work, initial funding for a Biotrust should be committed in the 
public interest by state or charitable donors, and experience indicates that state 
governments, medical charities, and even particular disease groups may be willing 
seed such an entity.50  The key benefit of the charitable trust is that the collection must 
be managed for public benefit.  However, some relationship with the private sector 
may be desirable to promote research and to funnel money back to support the trust 
infrastructure.  Once the charitable biotrust foundation is started it will likely sustain 
itself by charging reasonable fees for access to cover operation expenses. 
Furthermore, depending on the goals of the charitable trust, the biotrust foundation 
could contract for intellectual property rights in the research. 
 
Boggio has stated that the Winickoff & Winickoff model insufficiently details how it 
could balance openness and public-benefit with commercial collaboration.51  Boggio 
is correct that the Biotrust idea by itself says little about how an appropriate balance 
should be struck between maintaining open access and encouraging private 
collaboration.  The optimal balance cannot be prescribed, but will have to be worked 
out in practice.  The fact is, there are various ways that charitable biotrusts could 
strike this balance, depending on the goals and purposes of biotrust and its donors.  
 
Managing the public-private interface in genomics in a way that is acceptable to those 
involved may be one of the greatest challenges facing these endeavors.  A key strength 
of the Biotrust Model lies in its governance architecture -- in which power is shared 
across the board of trustees, donor representatives, and the ethics committee.  In its 
ideal form, this architecture would help foster a Habermasian space52 for public 
deliberation and learning not only about the use and operation of the biobank, but also 
about the new genetics and its effect on the political economy of health.  Joint 
governance creates the potential ability to deliberate policies regarding the private 
sector.  We imagine that the donor representatives will be in contact with the donor 
community through newsletters, public hearings and comment periods.  These efforts 
may be useful to achieve pragmatic policies, so long as they are ratified by the 
community. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Biomedical research has shifted meanings with the advent of new genetic 
technologies and an expanded role for the private sector.  Large genomic assemblages 
embody these changes, but they retain a strong public character and mandate due to 
the collective demands of this type of research.  The ongoing project to construct a 
genomic governance that acceptably orders the interface between public and private 
will likely fail until we reconceive genomics as an enterprise driven not by profit, but 
by collective political will.  The Biotrust Model attempts to create a framework for 
this reconception.  It is an attempt to create a vigorous public space through which a 
new social contract for biomedical research may be negotiated and ratified. At the 
same time, it seeks the elusive balance between respecting the dignity of human 
persons and generating public value, a balance that has been unsettled by the new 
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modalities of biological science, technology, and property.  In order to accomplish 
these tasks, it constructs a hybrid legal identity for genomic resources, one that stakes 
out a position between personhood and property, gift and commodity, group and 
individual, public and private.  Its merit, if it has any, will be measured not by its 
theoretical novelty, but by its practical ability to open pathways of democratic 
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Beyond genetic discrimination. Problems and perspectives of a 






In the recent past a number of empirical studies provided evidence that increasing 
genetic knowledge leads to new forms of exclusion, disadvantage and stigmatisation. 
As a consequence, many states have inaugurated special legislation to fight “genetic 
discrimination”.  
 
This article focuses on some theoretical, normative and practical problems in the 
scientific and political debate on genetic discrimination. It puts forward the thesis that 
the existing antidiscrimination approach is based on the implicit idea that genes are 
the essence of (human) life. Since genes are held responsible for individual 
development and personal identity, genetic discrimination is granted a privileged legal 
status in comparison to other forms of discrimination. As a result the analytical and 
political concentration on processes of genetic discrimination may reinforce the 
“geneticization” of body, illness and deviance. 
 
Beyond genetic discrimination. Problems and perspectives of a contested notion 
 
The sequencing of the human genome at the beginning of the new century marked a 
symbolic milestone in the progress of genetics.1 In the “post-genomic” era genetic 
research is about to transform concepts of health, illness and the body, and the 
practices of medicine and public health. Genetic tests already have been developed to 
identify the presence of particular alleles or polymorphisms that are linked to certain 
diseases. As the range and accuracy of these tests increase, many scholars anticipate a 
future when anyone may obtain genetic profile that can identify conditions for which 
he or she may be at elevated risk. Such knowledge should enable an individual to take 
preventive steps such as medication, medical monitoring, prophylactic surgery, or 
behavioural and environmental modification that may be wholly or partially effective 
to eliminating the onset of diseases.2 
 
As with many other new technologies, the implementation of genetic technology 
raises a number of social problems. One area of concern is “genetic discrimination”. 
As a series of empirical studies in different countries have shown the use of genetic 
information may lead to new forms of exclusion, disadvantaging and stigmatisation.3 
The spectrum of genetic discrimination ranges from disadvantages in work life via 
problems with insurance policies through to difficulties with adoption agencies. In 
some cases a person was turned down for a job because there were signs of a possible 
later illness. Likewise, health and life insurers terminated contracts or refused to 
conclude these if their (potential) clients were suspected of bearing the risk of a 
congenital disease. In other cases, couples were not allowed to adopt children if one 
of the two had a predisposition for a genetic illness. Experiences of genetic 
discrimination were also reported from healthcare agencies, the education sector and 
the military.4 
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The empirical studies on the problem of genetic discrimination have not gone 
unnoticed. In the scholarly debate and policy discussions in society, much has been 
made of the danger of a “biological underclass”.5 People who were disadvantaged, 
pathologised and stigmatised simply owing to their genetic structure. The fear of a 
“new form of social prejudice”6 led to numerous attempts to regulate the problem. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s a series of legislative initiatives and statements on 
the part of inter- and supranational organizations and commissions have been 
forthcoming to protect people from genetic discrimination. For example, the Council 
of Europe’s Convention on Biomedicine (Art. 11), UNESCO’s Declaration on the 
Human Genome (Art. 6), and the EU’s Charter on Fundamental Rights (Art. 21) all 
explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of genetic features. Likewise, many 
nations have issued regulations designed to ensure that no one is disadvantaged on the 
basis of his or her genetic constitution. Thus, in some countries, including Austria and 
Belgium, genetic discrimination is in principle forbidden. In the United States, special 
laws were resolved at an early date by individual states of the Union and by the 
federal government. In Germany, among others, there is currently discussion on 
additional legal initiatives to protect against genetic discrimination.  
 
However, it has since become ever more apparent that the concept of genetic 
discrimination, as is used in scholarly studies and in legal texts, entails various 
theoretical, normative and practical difficulties. I wish in this essay to address in 
greater depth four problematic areas that reveal significant gaps or weaknesses in the 
debate on genetic discrimination: Discrepancies in the use of the concept of 
discrimination in research practice (1); empirical shortcomings that mean central areas 
of genetic discrimination are not covered (2); conceptual problems in defining the 
special scientific status of genetic information (3); and finally normative 
ambivalences as the notion that genetic data should be subject to a more 
comprehensive protection compared with non-genetic information leads to unjustified 
unequal treatment of persons affected (4). The central argument I shall advance is that 
the theoretical and political-legal critique of practices of genetic discrimination 
frequently itself rests on the implicit notion that genes fundamentally influence human 
existence and form the core of our respective personalities. I suspect that this critique 
covertly relies on an essentialist concept of a genetic program that is deemed 
responsible for individual development and personal identity. In summary I shall 
present some conclusions drawn from this observation with regard to further scholarly 
and political discussion on genetic discrimination (5). 
 
1.  Definitional discrepancies: scope and content of genetic discrimination 
 
In the scholarly literature and also in the media and the relevant laws genetic 
discrimination signifies the unequal treatment of people owing to actual or suspected 
genetic differences from the “normal” genome. Here, genetic discrimination is strictly 
distinguished from discrimination owing to a disability or illness.7 All the relevant 
empirical studies rely on this definition of genetic discrimination, but the application 
of it in research practice has varied greatly – something that undermines the 
comparability of research findings.  
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Lapham et al. use a very broad concept of discrimination for their work; it includes 
not only presymptomatic cases, but also cases in which the persons in question have 
already fallen ill.8 As a result, phenotypical and genotypical characteristics are both 
used as the basis for defining the presence of genetic discrimination.9 Most other 
studies seek only to speak of genetic discrimination against the persons concerned if 
the symptoms of the illness are very mild or do not constitute a disability or restriction 
in performance.10 By contrast, an extremely narrow concept of discrimination is 
utilized by Mark A. Hall and Stephen S. Rich in their study, as they only take into 
account cases in which the persons concerned were completely presymptomatic, in 
other words in which the illness was in no manner manifest yet. The different 
concepts of discrimination lead to contrary findings: While Hall and Rich had 
difficulty documenting even a single case of genetic discrimination, the study by 
Lapham et al. states that almost half of those polled had experienced genetic 
discrimination.11  
 
Not just the scope, but also the substance of the concept of discrimination is a bone of 
scholarly contention. In the relevant studies, genetic discrimination is regularly 
construed as the “unjustified unequal treatment of persons owing to their genetic 
characteristics”.12 The literature usually takes a critical perspective: The implicit 
assumption is that unequal treatment owing to factual or suspected genetic differences 
is legally impermissible and/or morally objectionable. However, in addition to this 
majority view, there are other opinions that consider genetic discrimination a factually 
legitimate form of risk differentiation.13 An extreme position in this regard is taken in 
the libertarian argument advanced by Colin S. Diver and Jane Maslow Cohen. They 
contend that the unequal treatment of human beings owing to genetic factors is not 
only morally unproblematic and legally permissible, but also socially necessary as an 
economic instrument of resource allocation and risk calculation. From this standpoint, 
government prohibitions on genetic discrimination prevent the efficient market 
regulation that requires a “regime of genetic transparency”.14  
 
Needless to say, the conceptual discrepancies are not only of interest as regards 
research strategies and at the theoretical level, but are of great significance for 
legislative practice and social policy: Is genetic discrimination a legitimate means of 
risk differentiation in order to generate economic growth and prosperity or a social 
evil that calls for corresponding government measures to protect persons from it? And 
if the latter is the case, what individuals and groups with what illnesses and/or risks of 
illness should be protected against discrimination, and in what way? How broad or 
narrow should the circle of those be who are to benefit from legal protection? 
 
2.  Empirical deficits: “Everyday eugenics” and indirect discrimination  
 
The studies to date that deal with the problem of genetic discrimination have a clear 
emphasis. They concentrate on institutional actors disadvantaging individuals and 
their relatives. This analytical focus means that important practical areas of genetic 
discrimination do not get equal attention. I shall scrutinize two empirical deficits more 
closely here: the focus on institutional actors and the neglect of indirect forms of 
discrimination.15 
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2.1.  Focus on institutional actors and asymmetric decision-making  
 
So far studies of genetic discrimination mainly focused on institutional actors, on the 
one hand, and individuals and relatives, on the other. This juxtaposition is too strongly 
entrenched in the juridical frame of committer/victim. However correct and important 
it may be to expose discriminating practices by insurance companies, employers, 
adoption agencies and other organizations, this disregards a decisive arena of genetic 
discrimination: disrespect and stigmatisation by family, friends and fellow human 
beings. This “everyday discrimination” is systematically ignored in the studies to date, 
meaning a key field of genetic discrimination remains excluded.  
 
In addition to this analytical gap there is another problem: Literature on genetic 
discrimination tends to concentrate on the “negative” pattern of litigation: on coercive 
measures and asymmetric decision-making processes. The guiding idea here relates to 
organizations that refuse to sign contracts or reject qualifications. Thus, the studies 
exclude to investigate to what extent formally voluntary options for action and 
symmetrical decision-making situations can have a discriminating effect. A core 
element of the new genetic knowledge consists precisely of the fact that it transforms 
natural constrains into new individual options – options that may engender new 
constrains. Scholars discern a transition from a compulsory eugenics to a more 
indirect form of control and guidance of individuals, something the academic debate 
has termed “voluntary”16 “individualist”17, “liberal”18 or “everyday eugenics”19. 
Those critical accounts point to the fact that individual decisions and private choices 
may, taken collectively, have negative social effects and create new pressures on 
reproductive behaviour. While some scholars resist the idea that human genetics 
represents a disguised or a new kind of eugenics, the question remains whether the 
phenomenon of genetic discrimination is restricted to explicit prohibitions and rare 
exceptions, or may also result from “normal” risk assessments, “rational” concepts of 
health and the idea of a “self-regulative behavioural management”.20 
 
2.2.  Neglect of indirect mechanisms and structural links 
 
This conceptual problem points to the limits of a person-centred and case-oriented 
notion of discrimination. Alongside discrimination of people who are directly 
confronted by disadvantaging or stigmatisation, forms of “indirect” discrimination 
must also be considered. This should include all factors that indirectly influence the 
persons involved and constrain their scope for decision-making and their options for 
action. While direct genetic discrimination remains a matter of individual cases and 
describes the way in which certain people with genetic characteristics are treated as 
individuals, indirect discrimination refers to social judgments of unworthiness, 
structures of prejudice and forms of disrespect addressed to all members of society.21  
 
A comprehensive analysis of genetic discrimination must also focus on those 
strategies for action with which the persons affected anticipate negative categorization 
by their social environment and adapt their behaviour accordingly. The most effective 
means of pre-empting genetic discrimination entails not drawing genetic risks to the 
attention of other people, let alone institutional actors such as insurance companies or 
employers. This “information control” runs from the choice of spouse via neighbourly 
relations to working life. The persons affected feel the act of excluding their own risk 
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of falling ill and the related fears as a form of compulsion, as a restriction in forms of 
communication, and as the necessity to keep important information on themselves and 
their own future secret from others.22 
 
Moreover, the judgment on unworthiness as is expressed in practices of genetic 
discrimination, also impacts on decisions on reproduction that go far beyond the realm 
of those who are directly affected by the risk of genetic illness. While studies on the 
problem of genetic discrimination to date have concentrated on postnatal genetic tests 
and the disadvantaging of persons already born, it bears asking whether the analysis 
should not also cover the field of prenatal diagnostics (selective abortion on the basis 
of genetic indicators) and pre-implantation diagnostics (deliberate choice of 
genetically “desired” embryos).23 
 
But it does not suffice for a systematic analysis of genetic discrimination to simply 
internally differentiate between various practices of genetic discrimination. We must 
also consider the “structural links” between different forms of discrimination. In this 
way, we can study how forms of genetic discrimination link up with sexist and racist 
practices and mutually reinforce one another.24  
 
As regards the relationship of genetic discrimination and racism, it bears stating that 
some genetic illnesses are encountered more frequently in certain ethnic groups or 
groups of the population than in others. For example, sickle cell anemia occurs more 
frequently among persons of African descent, Tay-Sachs Syndrome is especially 
widespread among Ashkenazi Jews, and most persons with the beta thalassemia gene 
are inhabitants of the Mediterranean rim. Since certain ethnic groups are differently 
susceptible to specific genetic illnesses, there is a danger that members of minorities 
will be associated with such genes and treated pathologically, even if they do not bear 
the particular genetic mutation. For example, sickle-cell anemia in the United States is 
considered a disease of Afro-Americans, although it is to be found just as frequently 
among population groups from the Mediterranean rim.25 There is likewise the danger 
that there will be a disparity in resource allocation and in the public attention on these 
diseases. For example, in the USA research into cystic fibrosis, which affects 
primarily white coloured people, receives far more financial backing than does 
research into sickle cell anemia, even if the latter is far more widespread among the 
population as a whole.26  
 
The practice of gender verification at sports competitions is a striking example of the 
linking of genetic discrimination und sexism. Gender control by genetic testing 
emerged as an issue in the 1960s when there were rumours that men had passed 
themselves off as women to take part in women’s competitions. Despite the intensive 
criticism down through the years, genetic analyses are still undertaken to verify 
gender in sport. However, only women and not men have to have their gender 
verified, and suffer the possible consequences of “failing” such a test. Although 
almost all International Olympic Committees now forego such verification 
procedures, at world championships for some sports gender continues to be 
genetically “tested”. For example, at the Volleyball World Championship in 2002 in 
Germany, all the women were subjected to a genetic analysis if they did not have test 
results from a prior sports competition.27  
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A person-centred and case-oriented concept of discrimination is not able to explore the 
systematic links between racist and sexist practices and ideologies on the one hand, and 
patterns of geneticist interpretation and action, on the other. Genetic discrimination does 
not entail isolated and chance deviations from the norm, individual cases and erroneous 
institutional developments, but it points to social practices that divide persons into 
genetic categories and promote a belief in the determining power of genes.28 
Unfortunately notions of genetic essentialism frequently also shape the analysis and 
critique of genetic discrimination, leading to conceptual confusion on the one hand and 
normative ambivalences on the other.  
 
3.  Conceptual confusions: the exceptional epistemological status of  
 genetic information 
 
Studies on genetic discrimination and legislative initiatives to protect affected persons 
share a common presumption: both assume an exceptional status of genetic 
information in two ways.29 First, there is the claim that genetic information differs 
epistemologically from non-genetic information. From this perspective there is a clear 
scientific line dividing genetic testing from non-genetic procedures, genetic diseases 
from non-genetic conditions. Second, there is the suggestion that genetic information 
should be normatively distinguished from non-genetic information: discrimination on 
the basis of genetic data on the current or future health of a person is then unjust or 
more unjust compared to discrimination on the basis of non-genetic medical 
information. As I shall attempt to show, both assumptions are untenable. I shall focus 
in this section on the justifications for an exceptional epistemological status of genetic 
information, and then in the next section trace the normative problems to which this 
gives rise. 
 
3.1.  Genetic exceptionalism  
 
There are at least three arguments put forward to justify the exceptional (medical) 
position of genetic screening. Genetic analytical procedures are claimed to be more 
precise than other medical tests as they provide predictive information on the health of 
an individual. They are said to allow it to diagnose with certainty or greater 
probability whether a person will fall ill with a specific disease. Second, the results of 
genetic tests are said to enable conclusions to be drawn on the state of health or risk of 
illness of relatives of the person screened. Genetic tests are, thirdly, believed to differ 
from traditional diagnostic techniques and conventional medical methodologies, as 
they purportedly reveal fundamental personal characteristics of the person examined. 
All three criteria thus used to justify “genetic exceptionalism” do not stand up to 
closer scrutiny.30  
 
First, only a very few genetic tests allow predictive statements to be made on future 
illnesses. Genetic illnesses are as a rule characterized by incomplete penetration 
and/or variable expressivity.31 The former relates to the frequency with which genetic 
mutation actually trigger the corresponding disease in the person bearing the gene. In 
the case of complex illnesses such as cancer, Alzheimer’s or diabetes the presence of a 
changed gene does not necessarily lead to illness. For example, proof of a mutation of 
one of the so-called BRCA genes increases the statistical probability of a woman 
developing breast cancer, but the question whether, when and in what way she 
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succumbs to the illness is by no means answered.32 As recent studies have shown, 
even monogenetic illnesses such as cystic fibrosis or Morbus Huntington do not entail 
100% penetration.33  
 
Variable expressivity refers to the fact that the symptoms of one and the same illness 
can differ vastly from one individual to the next, although both possess the same 
mutated gene. In other words, the same DNA mutation can trigger quite different 
clinical symptoms – or none at all; conversely, one and the same disease can be 
triggered by different genetic variations.34 It bears stating here not only that the 
predictive value of genetic information is regularly exaggerated, but also that non-
genetic medical tests provide information on future health risks, such as a HIV test, a 
cholesterol screen, or the proof of an asymptomatic hepatitis B infection. Likewise, 
blood-pressure tests or proof of blood in stool are of great diagnostic importance when 
identifying illnesses at an early stage before the first symptoms of coronary heart 
disease or stomach cancer have arisen.35 
 
As regards the second criterion, it is also difficult to recognize the medical uniqueness 
or even the special status of genetic analyses. As Murray rightly emphasizes, people 
have long since known that their own risk of having an illness increases if the same 
illness has already arisen in their family. Likewise, in the past, doctors have relied on 
information on relatives to supplement their medical knowledge on a particular 
patient. Moreover, a person’s family history has for some time been factored into 
insurance contracts and/or consulted when defining premiums. Genetic tests are, in 
other words, neither the only nor the most important tools for using medical data on 
relatives in order to reach statements on an individual’s health status.36  
 
The third criterion differentiates between a fateful and immutable genetic 
predisposition, on the one hand, and chance and controllable environmental factors, 
on the other. This argument rests on the notion that genes are autonomous and active, 
forming a kind of control centre that steers and regulates the organism.37 This 
assumption is at best a vast simplification if not misleading or false. First, genes are 
not static units, but an integral part of a complicated biochemical network that is 
defined by the dynamic interaction of interdependent actors.38 For this reason, it is an 
impermissible simplification if we assume that a characteristic or function is 
determined in part by heredity and otherwise by environmental influences. This fails 
to consider that genetic changes can also be first acquired in the course of life owing 
to environmental influences and a specific life style.39 Furthermore, there can be no 
simple equation between genetic causality and an inevitable fate and/or non-genetic 
factors and personal scope to take free decisions. Neither do genetic causes of illness 
signal a necessary biological fate, nor are non-genetic conditions in principle easier to 
control than their genetic counterparts or the result of personal choices for which the 
individual is responsible.40 On the contrary, there are also many non-genetic factors 
which we as individuals can by no means control: “If the air we breathe and the water 
we drink are polluted, if our parents or co-workers are heavy smokers, if we are 
reasonably prudent but injured in an accident nonetheless, it is hard to say that we 
bear any significant measure of responsibility for the resulting illness”.41 
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All the three criteria that ostensibly justify the special (medical) position of genetic 
information discussed here thus prove unconvincing. That said, not only is the line 
dividing genetic from non-genetic factors is diffuse, but also it is not clear what 
exactly “genetic” means. Put differently: What we have here is thus not a definitional 
problem that results from an impermissible conflation or erroneous shift of the line 
dividing two essentially distinguishable components (genetic/non-genetic); instead, it 
is a systematic problem that lies in the “nature” of the matter at hand. What is 
respectively termed a “gene” or “genetic” entails great semantic flexibility and 
depends on the respective scientific definition and social context.42  
 
3.2.  Genetic or non-genetic? 
 
The concept of genetic illness has been constantly expanded in recent decades. Today, 
genetic factors are considered to be responsible not only for “monogenetic” illnesses 
(so-called congenital illnesses), but also for multifactored diseases such as cancer, 
Alzheimer’s, diabetes and many other widely-spread illnesses. This semantic 
expansion has gone hand in hand with a shift in meaning such that illnesses are 
increasingly construed as genetic deviations from the norm. However: If every illness 
can potentially be ascribed to genetic changes, it becomes questionable what exactly 
the contribution made by genetic factors is and/or how genetic causes of illnesses are 
to be distinguished from their non-genetic counterparts.43 
 
It is not only impossible to finally and definitively state what distinguishes a genetic 
illness from a non-genetic complaint; it is likewise unclear how genetic analyses can 
be distinguished sharply from non-genetic analyses. “Genetic diagnostics” is the 
umbrella term used to cover all types of diagnosis of genetically determined illnesses 
and features. This includes tests at the level of DNA as well as phenotypical diagnoses 
(such as the test for genetically conditioned colour blindness), chromosome 
examinations and analyses at the level of genetic products.44  
 
Joseph S. Alper and Jon Beckwith rightly point out that this comprehensive definition 
of genetic tests applies to practically all clinical test procedures. They emphasize that 
most medical tests focus on diagnosing abnormal concentrations of biochemical units. 
Typically, these units are proteins that are generated directly by genes, or molecules 
whose synthesis depends to a more or less large degree on the activity of the genes. 
Which is why a striking biochemical finding can be the result of a changed gene or 
genotype. Even if these non-genetic tests focus on determining the function of the 
various organs, they possibly also provide information on genetic characteristics. In 
addition, in some cases only the medical context can decide whether a genetic or a 
non-genetic test is involved: “A test of blood cholesterol concentration may be 
regarded as genetic when testing an individual with a family history of 
hypercholesterolemia, a single gene recessive disorder. The same test is clearly a non-
genetic medical test when ordered in the course of a routine physical examination.”45 
 
It follows that genetic diseases cannot be exclusively detected by means of genetic 
testing (or, to be more precise, DNA diagnostics). In many cases, conventional 
screening procedures can reliably prove the existence of a genetic condition. The fact 
that a distinction between genetic and other diagnostic devices is not merely a 
technical matter can be seen from the history of the PKU screening as reconstructed 
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by Diane Paul. PKU is a metabolic illness where an enzyme defect prevents the 
amino-acid phenylalanine being transformed into tyrosine. However, initiating a 
special diet when the patient is still a child can largely offset this problem. When, in 
the 1960s, the so-called Guthrie Test was developed and used as a diagnostic tool with 
newborn infants, the genetic dimension of the disease played no role; instead, back 
then PKU was considered a treatable form of mental retardation. Moreover, the 
method used to prove its existence is a biochemical test, not DNA-level screening. 
Only much later did the Guthrie Test come to be regarded as a genetic test and PKU 
as a genetic condition – a label that served various interests at the same time. The 
molecular medicine visionaries were able to point to the PKU Test to demonstrate that 
genetic tests exist that does provide a therapeutic benefit. That said, critics of genetic 
screening also profited from the label “genetic test”. In the framework of the Human 
Genome Project, commissions were set up in the United States and various other 
countries to specifically regulate genetic analyses (in contrast to other medical tests). 
Since genetic screening requires greater technical care and more intensive legal 
regulation than do other methods, the definition of the PKU Test as a genetic test was 
also of interest to critics of genetic determinism who are sceptical of the increasing 
use of genetic screening.46  
 
It is obviously not only difficult to distinguish with any scientific precision between 
genetic and non-genetic diseases. Moreover, the dividing line between genetic and 
non-genetic tests can also not be defined intrinsically in technical terms. As we saw, in 
the final instance the difference is the product of social negotiations and scientific 
compromises. This insight has a strong impact on political initiatives that endeavour 
to regulate the use of genetic data by means of special anti-discrimination legislation.  
 
4.  Normative ambivalences: the legal privilege of genetic information 
 
Discrimination on the basis of genetic factors is directed against “asymptomatic ill 
persons”47, while discrimination of ill and disabled persons results in unequal 
treatment on the basis of phenotypic features. Generally, the former is considered 
more problematic in moral and legal terms than the latter, which leads to a 
asymmetrical treatment of those suffering from discriminatory practices. First, genetic 
and non-genetic discrimination are treated differently in legal terms, which prompts 
the question what criteria are used to justify such an unequal treatment of persons who 
are equally affected by discriminatory practices. Second, there is the danger that the 
exceptional legal status of genetic discrimination simply “normalizes” all non-genetic 
forms of discrimination. If in the widest variety of different social areas the disabled 
and the ill are regularly discriminated against compared with the healthy, then this 
appears legitimate to the extent special protection exists for persons who are affected 
by practices of genetic discrimination.48 Put differently: the concentration on the legal 
impermissibility and moral reprehensibility of genetic discrimination isolates different 
forms of discrimination, plays them off against one another, and threatens to augment 
the social acceptance of practices of non-genetic discrimination.  
 
Gregor Wolbring has pointed out that in principle two completely different strategies 
for legal policy are conceivable in order to prevent discrimination against 
asymptomatic ill persons. The one path could be to extend and expand existing anti-
discrimination legislation on the equal treatment of the disabled such that it equally 
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covers discrimination against the asymptomatic and symptomatic, the genetic and the 
non-genetic ill. However, at present a quite different approach is being taken in the 
United States and many other countries that envisage special laws to protect the 
asymptomatic ill. The laws or legislative projects currently being negotiated are based 
on a strict and unequivocal distinction between the asymptomatic and symptomatic ill. 
Wolbring points out that this serves to increase the legal gap between the two groups 
of persons affected. Instead of grasping genetic discrimination as an integral part of a 
social continuum of discriminatory practices, it is considered as a specific caesura to 
be distinguished in conceptual and normative terms from other forms of 
disadvantaging. As Wolbring rightly remarks, it is however questionable whether 
discrimination against the asymptomatic ill would exist without discrimination against 
the symptomatic ill and the disabled.49 
 
Strikingly, there are differences in the legal and moral appraisal not only as regards 
the symptomatic as opposed to asymptomatic ill, but also within the group of the 
asymptomatic ill. A distinction is made there between persons affected by genetic 
risks and those exposed to non-genetic risks of illness. Both sections of the group 
share the fact that the illness is not yet developed, and will possibly never do so, but 
the legal evaluation of the risks is completely different. The problem is perhaps best 
illustrated by juxtaposing two similar cases that were decided almost simultaneously 
in the same federal state of Germany.  
 
4.1.  “From the cradle” – The rebirth of genetic essentialism as anti 
 discrimination policy 
 
The first case was recently taken up by various media and found a lot of attention 
inside and outside Germany.50 In August 2003, the State of Hessen refused to employ 
a teacher as a civil servant after she had completed her trial period. The enquiry by the 
officially appointed occupational physician had revealed that the young woman’s 
father suffered from Huntington’s Disease.51 The report came to the conclusion that at 
the present point in time the applicant’s health was suitable to enable her to take up 
the job, but she was barred from becoming a civil servant on the ground that there was 
an increased probability that she would fall ill in the foreseeable future and become 
enduringly unfit to discharge her duties. The applicant lodged an appeal against this 
decision before the Administrative Court in Darmstadt, which ruled mainly in her 
favour and instructed the State of Hessen to immediately appoint her to government 
service. In the court’s opinion, the school authorities had wrongly assessed the state of 
her health as an applicant, as they had claimed that the 50-percent risk of illness 
meant there was a “most strong probability” she would enduringly not be able to 
discharge her duties. The school board declined to contest the decision and has since 
employed the woman in question under a government service contract.52  
 
At the same time, another case was before the courts but attracted far less public 
attention. Again in Hessen, a young man was dismissed while still on probation for 
government service, as in the opinion of his employers given his weight of 120 kg his 
health was not suited for a career in general administration. Here again the applicant 
took the matter before the courts. However, in its ruling the Frankfurt Administrative 
Court confirmed that the dismissal was legal as the employer was permitted to pre-
empt the risk of having to foot the bill for later enduring damage to the man’s health.53 
            Genomics, Society and Policy 




Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.1 No.3 (2005) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© CESAGen, Lancaster University, UK. www.gspjournal.com 
32
In other words, although the applicant was not yet ill and it is completely uncertain 
whether and in what way his elevated body weight might impair his health in the 
future he was treated in legal terms as though he were already incapable of pursuing 
his duties. 
 
These examples show that the distinction between genetic and non-genetic 
information cannot serve as the basis for legal differentiation. First, it is not 
intelligible why, for example, the use of biochemical methods that allow making 
inferences on a person’s genetic disposition is permissible for discriminatory 
purposes, while DNA tests, that reach the same results, are forbidden. It would seem 
not only fairly impractical but also unfair to prohibit an insurance company from 
evaluating a genetic analysis for a complex disease, while the results of a non-genetic 
test for the same illness may be relied on. This methodology essentially creates a legal 
situation in which people with positive genetic diagnoses receive more protection 
against discrimination and data abuse than those whose findings are based on non-
genetic methods: “Would the law mean that the records of a person with a 
presymptomatic heart condition who was given a genetic test for some mutant gene 
associated with heart disease would be covered by anti-discrimination provisions, but 
not the records of a person with the same condition whose physician order only 
nongenetic tests?”54  
 
Second, it remains unclear why institutional actors such as insurance companies or 
employers should be forbidden from using a source of genetic information (genetic 
screening) although they are allowed to draw on other forms of genetic knowledge. 
For example, according to a draft by the German Health Ministry for a bill on genetic 
diagnostics, an insurance company would be prohibited from demanding that a 
woman who a BRCA test shows as positive for breast cancer pay a higher insurance 
premium, whereas this is permissible with regard to a woman who has preferred not to 
undergo genetic screening but in whose family several women have already had 
breast cancer.55 This asymmetric decision-making principle not only violates the 
principle of fairness, but also means we must fear that such a regulation will compel 
people to opt for genetic analyses even if they did not originally want to – for 
example, in order to get insurance policies (at standard conditions).56  
 
Third, the increasing discovery of genetic factors for the genesis of illnesses will in 
future make it ever harder to draw a line between genetic and non-genetic conditions. 
With reference to the above-mentioned case, a series of research findings could be 
cited, for example, that point to a genetic component in obesity.57 What would the 
judgment be if an applicant could credibly claim that a specific genetic disposition is 
(co-) responsible for his increased body weight? Would we then be confronted by a 
case of genetic discrimination and would need to specially protect those concerned 
from it?  
 
To summarize, we can say that the emphasis of anti-discrimination policies is 
evidently more on the (genetic) “nature” of information and less on social practices in 
which these data are used and evaluated.58 The legislation to protect against genetic 
discrimination are not least the product of the implicit notion that genes 
fundamentally influence human existence and constitute the core of each personality. 
It is accordingly unfair to punish persons for something that they cannot themselves 
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control.59 This logic is also to be found in the justifications given by the German 
Health Ministry for the planned legislation on genetic diagnostics. The statement in 
question says that any form of genetic discrimination must be countered: “For our 
genetic characteristics ‘are with us in the cradle’ and we are therefore not responsible 
for them”.60 This argument may initially seem plausible, but on closer inspection is 
not very convincing, as it is based on the idea of a genetic program that is 
“responsible” for the development and identity of individuals and that both constitutes 
and constraints their scope for action. It is the assumption of a particular power and 
autonomy of genetic factors that forms the basis for their privileged legal status. In 
principle, there are many non-genetic factors that are just as little susceptible to 
personal control although we do not call for them to be specifically protected. It is by 
no means evident why a person whose higher risk of contracting a specific type of 
cancer, say, is attributable to genetic factors, should enjoy greater protection than 
some one whose health is threatened by environmental factors such as poor working 
conditions or polluted air. Should not this group of persons likewise be effectively 
protected?61 
 
We can assume that the explicit withdrawal of responsibility in the case of genetic 
risks of illness is the other side of the coin of an increasing ascription of responsibility 
for all non-genetic factors.62 The reductionist concept of genetic fatalism that 
purportedly unravel automatically and independently of the individual person’s will 
contrasts with the radicalized appeal to personal responsibility and personal 
accountability as regards health and the prevention of illness.63 Possibly, the different 
judgments in the two afore-mentioned cases stem from a shared underlying logic that 
places the question of personal responsibility at the centre of things. Increased body 
weight and the resulting risks to a person’s health are essentially considered the 
(erroneous) result of individual choice, while the risk of contracting Morbus 
Huntington is viewed as biological fate and thus treated as something for which a 
person cannot be held responsible. 
 
5.  Critical paradoxes  
 
The call to distinguish genetic discrimination from other types of discrimination and 
subject it to special legislation has a paradoxical impact. The prohibition on the 
“unequal treatment” of people with an “abnormal” genetic constitution reinforces the 
cultural belief in the exceptional status of genetic factors, something which the legal 
regulation was supposed to counter in the first place. The analysis and critique of 
genetic discrimination itself relies on the phantasm that genes forms the “blueprint” 
for an individual and the “secret of life”.64 In this way, the anti-discrimination 
legislation threatens to intensify the very problem it set out to solve. This brings us up 
against a key dilemma.65 On the one side, there are practices of genetic discrimination 
and people who suffer from these practices and, on the other, genetic essentialism is 
rejuvenated and reinforced by the academic and legal confirmation of the special role 
of genetic factors. 
 
This dilemma by no means signifies that legal stipulations to protect people with 
genetic peculiarities are superfluous or even damaging. On the contrary, even if 
genetic information, seen scientifically, should be accorded no privileged role over 
non-genetic data, in social reality they quite obviously have a pronounced 
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importance.66 In cultural terms, genes symbolize something fateful and immutable67, 
are considered “the most intimate biological property that we have”68 and are thought 
to decisively influence the individual course of life69. Unlike other health risks, that 
are temporary, treatable, and can essentially be eliminated, genes are construed as the 
basis for a person’s identity. He or she is said to “carry” or “possess” not only genetic 
risks, these are actually considered to be an integral part of the person’s physical 
existence.70 If genetic factors are made responsible for a disease, then the person 
affected feels they are not controllable and are thus more threatening than if non-
genetic reasons are cited.71 Equally, the risk of genetic illness cannot be separated 
from the history of eugenics, the cataloguing and murdering of people who were 
considered “genetically inferior”, from a trans-generational notion of illness and the 
idea of “defective” or “poor” genes.72 As long as this cultural stereotype and historical 
prejudice persists, and people are disadvantaged or shown disrespect owing to their 
genetic peculiarities, it is imperative to legally protect them.  
 
However, such legal protection must not result in genetic data being isolated form 
other (predictive) medical information. Genetic discrimination is the result of an 
increasing extension of the concept of illness and disability and the expansion of 
existing practices of contempt, stigmatization and exclusion. For this reason, the 
prohibition on genetic discrimination must necessarily be supplemented by profound 
institutional reforms and comprehensive regulations that more effectively protect 
persons already ill or disabled from social exclusion and disadvantage.73 That said, it 
is also necessary to rethink the analysis and critique of genetic discrimination with a 
view to its premises and goals. Otherwise we would run the risk of the distinction 
between genetic and non-genetic leading us to ignore the more fundamental question 
of the way (predictive) medical information is in general used to categorize persons, 
attribute characteristics and features to them, and exclude them from particular 
benefits.74 In the absence of such dual self-enlightenment, the critique of genetic 
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New mothers’ awareness of newborn screening, and their attitudes to 
the retention and use of screening samples for research purposes 
 




Aim: To explore new mothers’ knowledge of newborn screening, and their attitudes 
towards issues surrounding sample retention and the potential for blood screening 
samples to be used for research.  
 
Methods: A self-administered mail survey was sent to women who gave birth in 
Perth, Western Australia during January 2005. A total of 600 women completed the 
survey.  
 
Results: It was found that women were aware of newborn screening, however desired 
further information in order to acquire a more comprehensive knowledge of the test.  
Further, women reported discomfort with the long-term storage of cards, but they 
were supportive of using blood samples for medical research, contingent upon the 
samples being de-identified and parental consent provided.  
 
Conclusions: New mothers need to be provided with comprehensive information 
about the newborn screening test at a time which is conducive for the assimilation of 
this information. In addition, whilst supporting health related research using newborn 
screening samples, new mothers are keen for ethical issues to be sufficiently 
addressed prior to samples being systematically stored for extended periods of time.  
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For several decades the genetic blood screening of newborns to detect inborn errors of 
metabolism has been recognised as a valuable component of neonatal care in many 
developed countries around the world.1 2 The early detection of these disorders has 
proven an effective means by which interventions can be implemented to significantly 
reduce morbidity, mortality and associated disabilities.3 4 5 Publicly funded newborn 
screening programs have been operating in Australia since 1964, and although 
participation is entirely voluntary, there is high public participation in most 
programs1, enabling them to be cost effective.6 
 
At present Australian newborn screening programs are working towards developing a 
nationally consistent approach to the retention of newborn screening cards, and 
secondary uses of the blood samples derived from these cards. At the time of this 
study in 2005, retention periods still vary significantly across States, ranging from two 
years to indefinitely. Such considerable differences between programs is reflective of 
the situation internationally where there is no agreement on the appropriate retention 
period of newborn blood samples.2,7 Closely associated with sample retention periods 
is the issue of what, if any, secondary uses are appropriate for the blood samples 
collected for the sole purpose of newborn screening.  
 
While sample retention for forensic and quality assurance purposes, and for the 
development or modification of screening tests is justifiable, it is the potential for 
these samples to be used to conduct population based health screening studies and 
epidemiological research that prompts the need to articulate agreed standards in this 
area. It is very difficult to obtain population datasets of this kind that derive from the 
whole population with no selection.7 Consequently, the research opportunities are 
plentiful. In the United Kingdom, the value of conducting research based on blood 
samples gathered through newborn screening is acknowledged as having contributed 
towards answering important public health questions and leading to advancements in 
newborn and antenatal screening technologies.8   
 
At the same time, significant ethical issues underlie the ability to access blood 
samples derived from newborn screening, including the appropriateness of using 
samples obtained through dissent rather than informed consent for secondary 
purposes,2 and the ability to garner public support for such research. Biological 
specimen databanks are often met with great reservation by the public because of their 
potential for misuse and a lack of visible bodies to provide regulation.7 Further, these 
ethical issues may vary according to the levels of access researchers would be 
afforded, in particular whether they would have access to identified or de-identified 
samples. 
 
Ascertaining the views of the community, and parents in particular, about the retention 
and use of newborn blood samples forms a critical component of the development of 
any policy in this area. Such studies are a growing area of investigation within the 
psychology of newborn screening,9 although not yet explored extensively. To date 
these studies have targeted the parent’s levels of knowledge about the programs and 
any psychosocial issues related to the provision of positive test results for particular 
disorders.10 11 12 13 It is reasonable to anticipate that the attitudes of parents whose 
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child has been diagnosed through newborn screening may be different from those 
parents whose child was found not to have an inborn error of metabolism, or from the 
community in general.  
 
Although several factors influence parental views about newborn screening, parents 
have been found to be generally supportive of newborn screening programs, even in 
the case where false-positive test results have been given.4 Positive attitudes are not 
necessarily contingent upon adequate knowledge of screening, as there is substantial 
evidence suggesting that parents often have limited knowledge of which disorders are 
tested for, the effects of the disorders and the treatments available.9 Many new 
mothers are not even aware of the test being performed on their child.14 Further, a 
recent study has found that parents in the United States are not well informed about 
the storage of cards, or their potential uses, and only five percent of educational 
materials aimed at informing parents about newborn screening actually address these 
issues.15 Although data regarding attitudes towards storage and use of newborn 
screening samples is limited, Gustafsson Stolt et al (2002) report their respondents 
expressing concern about the storage of material and the right to be informed of any 
screening or project results.16  
  
In relation to using newborn blood samples for research purposes, data from Sweden 
suggests that mothers have generally positive attitudes to research. Those who choose 
to allow their child’s blood sample to be used for research cite the potential to 
contribute to research as the primary motivation for doing so.16 Those who do not 
allow participation often cite concerns about making decisions on behalf of their child 
regarding genetic material as a primary consideration.16 
 
The paucity of information about parental attitudes in relation to issues in newborn 
screening,13 has been identified as an issue requiring exploration. For policy 
development in particular, greater dialogue between government and community is 
necessary so that community concerns and any associated ethical issues may be 
adequately addressed.7,16 This study aims to explore new mothers’ knowledge and 
attitudes towards newborn genetic blood screening. Specifically, it aims to ascertain 
new mothers’ awareness of newborn screening, and their attitudes about issues 






Women who gave birth during the month of January 2005 were invited to participate. 




Information was collected via a self-administered mail survey, which women received 
four month’s after the birth of their child. Items included in the survey were 
constructed following a review of the literature. Further, the investigators met with a 
group of new mothers to ask them about their experience with newborn blood 
screening to inform survey construction. A pilot study was also conducted to verify 
ease of understanding. 
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The survey investigated four key areas, namely awareness of newborn screening, 
attitudes about appropriate retention periods for samples, attitudes towards the use of 
samples for secondary purposes specifically research, and demographic information. 
Participants were also given the opportunity to provide comments in order to enable 




Women meeting the inclusion criteria were selected from the Midwives Notification 
Database located at the Department of Health (Western Australia). These women were 
sent a copy of the survey, along with an information sheet detailing the method of 
participant selection, the purpose of the study, background information on newborn 
screening, and a reply paid envelope. Women were informed that completion and 
return of the survey was deemed consent to participate.  
 
The University of Western Australia Human Research Ethics Committee approved the 
study and the Confidentiality in Health Information Committee at the Department of 
Health, Western Australia granted access to the Midwives Notification Database. 
 
Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics, Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation multiple response analysis 




The survey was sent to 1846 new mothers, of which 600 returned a completed survey, 
equating to a response rate of 33%. Although this response rate is typical for a self-
completed mail survey,17 and for new mothers in particular,18 an independent group of 
new mothers was sampled through seven new mother’s groups in the metropolitan 
area to check for bias in the study cohort. All new mothers present completed a short 
version of the mail survey (N = 52).  Demographic data were not collected on these 
new mothers. Responses from this sample were consistent with those obtained in the 
main survey. 
 
Ages ranged from 18 to 47 years with the mean age of the sample being 32 years. The 
number of children the women had ranged from one child to seven, with the average 
being two children. First time mothers comprised 44% of the sample. The majority of 
women lived within the metropolitan area (78%). Over a third of women had a 
university education (36%), and 27% reported that they had post-secondary school 
qualifications. 
 
To determine the representativeness of the sample, data from the Midwives 
Notification Database on all women who gave birth during January 2005 was 
obtained. Table 1 illustrates the differences between the population group and the 
sample collected. 
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Table 1. Comparison of population and sample demographics 
 
 Population (N = 1945) Sample (N = 600) 
Mean age 














   
 
 
Awareness of Newborn Genetic Blood Screening   
The majority of women (93%) stated that they had heard of newborn genetic blood 
screening prior to receiving the survey.  They reported receiving this information from 
a variety of sources (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Respondent’s reported sources of information about newborn screening 
 
 Sources of information Most popular sources reported (%)  
 Midwife 
 Previous pregnancy 
 Newborn screening pamphlet 
 General practitioner or 
      obstetrician 







  1% 
 
Over half of all respondents were satisfied with the information provided (51%), with 
the remainder reporting higher (19%) or lower levels of satisfaction (18%). When 
provided with the opportunity to comment further, the women stated that the time at 
which the information was provided was a significant factor in determining their 
ability to adequately consider the information: 
 
I feel the test isn’t discussed enough at the time it is done. A midwife 
takes your baby, does the test, brings baby back and leaves a 
pamphlet that on most occasions gets put aside with all that’s going 
on. 
 
(The information) could have been lost in avalanche of other 
information and emotion.  
                       
Women also reported that they would have liked to receive more comprehensive 
information: 
 
Only very general information was given to me when the tests were 
done. I would have liked more detailed information (from midwife or 
information booklets).   
 
I don’t believe the information I received from my GP, Obstetrician, 
or hospital was adequate.    
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In order to gauge the extent to which women valued newborn genetic blood screening, 
they were asked to rate their agreement with the following statement: ‘I believe 
newborn blood screening is valuable for enabling the early detection of genetic 
disorders in children’. The majority either strongly agreed (61%) or agreed (34%). 
Only 5% stated that they either disagreed or held no opinion.  Women who had 
received information about newborn screening are more likely to value the screening 
test (.099, p = .017) and women’s belief in the value of newborn screening positively 
correlated with the degree to which they are satisfied with the information they were 
provided (.370, p = .000). 
 
Newborn Blood Sample Retention Periods 
Women were asked to nominate an appropriate time-period for retaining newborn 
blood samples before they are destroyed (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Support for proposed newborn screening blood sample retention periods 
 
 Period of Retention Percentage of Respondents 
 2 years or less 
 3 – 10 years 
 11 – 20 years 
 21 years or more 
 Indefinitely 
 Unsure 









When asked to nominate reasons for their choice, women who believed in maintaining 
the retention period of two years spoke of not possessing adequate knowledge of the 
issues involved to justify deviating from current practice: 
 
I do not know a lot about the screening test nor have heard of 
reasons why they may be kept longer. Perhaps if I had more 
information my answer may be different. 
 
I don’t know enough about the information gathered from the 
screening to believe the timeframe should be different from the 
present period of two years.   
 
Other reasons for maintaining the current practice two-year retention period included 
statements that the time was adequate for the primary purpose of the test to be 
achieved and that this short period of time is a safeguard against any unnecessary 
research: 
 
My understanding is the disorders checked for occur in 
infancy…and two years should be adequate to gather data for any 
research needs.   
 
(Two years is appropriate) so information is gathered promptly and 
cards don’t just sit there waiting for someone to come up with 
something new to research. 
 
            Genomics, Society and Policy 




Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.1 No.3 (2005) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© CESAGen, Lancaster University, UK. www.gspjournal.com 
47
Some women also distinguished between the results of the tests, believing that a 
longer period of retention could be justifiable for those samples, which test positive to 
enable research. 
 
Women who nominated between 3-10 years as being an appropriate retention period 
were keen to promote research on the samples, believing that this time enabled more 
research to take place. They also reported the belief that this period allowed for 
advancements in technology to enable the cards to be re-checked if necessary: 
 
It could provide a reference point if the child develops any problems 
beyond two years, plus it may be useful for future research which 
should be automatic unless parent specifies otherwise.                 
 
The longer retention periods of cards was also nominated because it is in keeping with 
standard record retention periods of between 5 to 10 years for important 
documentation, such as those required for taxation purposes. 
  
There was also support for a retention period of 21 years or longer (17%), the 
advantage of which was the facilitation of research opportunities. 
 
Attitudes towards the Use of Newborn Blood Samples for Research Purposes  
Most of the cohort (85%) believed that de-identified newborn screening samples 
should be made available for research, the remainder either disagreed (4%) or were 
unsure (11%).  
 
In order to gain an appreciation for the strength of women’s belief in the use of cards 
for research, they were asked the extent to which they agreed with the statement “I 
would agree to my baby’s card being used for research”. It was found that 85% of 
respondents either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement. A further 9% held no 
opinion, and 5% disagreed. In addition, 79% either strongly agreed or agreed with the 
statement “I would like to have the opportunity to contribute positively to research 
through newborn screening cards”. This sense of support for research was also 
reflected in the comments: 
 
Whatever information can be collected and research done on cards 
can only be of a benefit to medical community to better understand 
genetic diseases or other diseases that are influenced by lifestyle / 
environment. 
 
The women viewed de-identification of blood samples as a priority. It was found that 
when questioned about the importance of de-identifying blood samples for any 
purpose other than newborn screening, 90% of the sample agreed that this should 
occur. The importance of de-identification was also demonstrated through the 
comments provided: 
 
I am happy for my child's blood screening test to be used for 
research…as long as my child's identity and personal information is 
removed. 
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I feel strongly about ensuring that genetic details and information is 
kept private. Guaranteed privacy of genetic information would be 
essential to my support of any research.                          
 
Closely associated with this is their belief that parental consent should be sought prior 
to the samples being made available for research purposes:  
  
I feel strongly that consent should have to be given before samples 
are used for any purpose other than the specified genetic tests. 
 
Additionally, women were keen to receive information about the 
types of research that may be conducted so that they could make an 
informed decision as to whether the research is compatible with 
their ethical values: 
 
If this information was used for research I would like to know what type of research 
to decide if I agreed with it ethically and morally. 
 
I would be fine with use of sample for research if it was specifically outlined what the 
use would be and how the sample would be stored / destroyed / managed.          
 
In order to ascertain if women’s attitudes would be dependent upon the type of 
research that the samples could be used for, four research areas were listed and 
women were asked to nominate the extent to which they felt using the samples would 
be appropriate. These areas were (i) to understand the prevalence of disease in the 
community, (ii) to improve diagnostic tests for childhood diseases, (iii) to understand 
how lifestyle factors influence genetic diseases, and (iv) to improve diagnostic testing 
of diseases. All four areas were overwhelmingly supported. The most support was 
given to improving diagnostic tests for childhood diseases (97%), followed by 
improving diagnostic testing (96%), understanding prevalence of disease (93%), and 
lifestyle and genetic interactions (92%).  
 
When asked to nominate any types of research that would be unacceptable uses of 
newborn screening cards, the fields of uses most commonly cited were cloning, 
research that leads to abortion, ‘designer babies’, and the use of the information for 
paternity issues or criminal investigations.  
 
Further, women noted the need for necessary safeguards against inappropriate use to 
be in place prior any changes to current practice: 
 
I would be happy for my child’s card to be used for research but 
have concerns regarding the safety of personal and genetic 
information, and the relevance of the research. I wouldn’t want the 
cards kept for the purposes of doing research that does not directly 
benefit the community.            
 
Ethics is an important issue here and the availability of data to 
insurance companies, other family members, police etc without 
consent or by law is a problem not yet dealt with.                                                                              
 
Other Relationships 
No relationships between demographic factors and outcomes on the key variables 
were found.   
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This study investigated knowledge and attitudes of new mothers who had received no 
further information about newborn screening from the researchers, other than that 
presented in the newborn screening pamphlet, prior to completing the survey. In this 
way, the results generated provide a sound indication of the views of new mothers in 
Western Australia about issues relating to newborn screening and the potential use of 
screening samples for secondary purposes.  
 
The results suggest that women are aware of newborn screening, but do not feel that 
they are well informed. This echoes previous research indicating that new mothers 
possess limited awareness of the newborn screening test being performed,14 and its 
purpose, including the diseases being tested.9,19 Most women received screening 
information within the 72-hour period after the birth of their child. During this time, 
they receive a plethora of information relating to other aspects of neonatal care.  It is 
also common for midwives to perform the blood test away from the mother to 
circumvent any unnecessary anxiety,14 so it is not surprising that women may have 
difficulty assimilating screening information for a test for which they must ‘opt-out’. 
 
Previous studies have shown that the time at which screening information is provided 
was a critical determinant of women’s ability to adequately absorb the information. 
Therefore it may be more beneficial for health professionals to endeavour to provide 
this information during the prenatal period.2,15 In addition to facilitating the 
comprehension of the material, presenting information at this time would also enable 
more detail to be passed onto parents, and provide an opportunity for questions to be 
asked. Women were keen to receive additional newborn screening information 
through government pamphlets. Only a small proportion of women reported reading 
this pamphlet, and therefore it may be useful to ascertain if other forms of 
communicating this information may be more relevant for this group.   
 
Ensuring that women have adequate time to consider screening information becomes 
even more salient when considering the possibility of research on newborn blood 
samples. There was considerable support for the use of blood samples for research, 
and this support was motivated by the desire to make a positive contribution to 
research, mirroring results found for a similar cohort overseas.16 The women were 
also particularly supportive of research targeted at child health issues, indicating a 
belief that research on stored samples should be closely aligned with the primary 
purpose of the sample collection. However, support for research was contingent upon 
safeguards against breaches to privacy and policy makers need to be mindful of the 
public’s wariness of biobanks and ensure that the appropriate safeguards are in place 
prior to the systematic storage of newborn blood samples for extended periods. 
 
In relation to retention periods, the strong support of maintaining the current WA 
storage period of two years is to be expected. Without a thorough knowledge of the 
issues, determining a justification for nominating a longer time-period is difficult. 
Nevertheless, the women equally supported storage of between three to ten years to 
allow adequate time for research. The qualitative data also suggests that women are 
generally uncomfortable with the long-term retention of cards for research purposes. 
These results suggest that given appropriate justification, samples may be stored for 
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longer than the current two-year period, although storage beyond a decade is 
unsupported.    
 
There were specific aspects arising from this research which merit further 
investigation. In particular, this study did not collect information on whether any of 
the women participating had received either a positive or a false positive test result. 
Although the expected numbers for such results would be low, it would nevertheless 
be valuable to explore any differentiation between these groups from the core group 
across all variables. Secondly, the investigation of women’s awareness of screening 
could be explored in greater detail to gain an indication of women’s actual knowledge 
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Health as a genetic planning project: Enthusiasm and second 
thoughts among biomedical researchers and their research subjects 
 




This paper presents an interview study among scientists working with Decode 
genetics in Iceland and lay individuals having recently donated blood to Decode. 
While genuinely enthusiastic that genetic technologies hold great potential to avert 
disease, the informants shared concerns that extensive predictive genetic testing, 
preventive treatment and tailoring of lifestyle to avoid potential disease may cause 
loss of freedom – people can “worry themselves sick”. Undiscriminating use of 
genetic technologies in privileged populations was seen as a potential source of 
injustice and reduced tolerance of diversity. Both lay informants and scientists 
revealed ambiguity and inconsistency in their personal evaluation of genetic 
knowledge, indicating that ‘rational choice’ models do not predict how people relate 
to information about risk, expert knowledge notwithstanding. Drawing on work by 
Wynne and van Hooft, we submit that our informants’ ambivalence and second 
thoughts are implicit contradictions of prescriptive messages accompanying human 
genetics – i.e. more or less covert and non-intentional claims about the rational 
obligation to minimise the likelihood that one falls ill and a strictly biological 
conception of health. Genetic technologies designed to prevent or combat organic 
disease can interfere negatively with non-biological levels of health. It is a challenge 
of reflexive modernity to untangle the interaction of human genetics with culturally 
mediated categories of relatedness, purpose and meaning in everyday life, and 
mobilise cultural and governance resources which can ensure that genetic 




Public debate on human genetics can be both polarized and polarizing. On one hand, a 
significant subset of the public in many countries is wary of many uses of human 
genetics and certain other biotechnologies. On the other, dominant science policy 
discourse – apparently supported by the majority of the public – expresses a general 
approval of these technologies as a major source of improved health, quality of life 
and economic growth, with a few exceptions such as human reproductive cloning.1 
Mass media appear to reinforce polarization by their very repertoire in the framing of 
human genetics. There is the frame of technological optimism, emphasising scientific 
bravery and reproducing scientific promises of relief from disease and suffering.2 
Alternatively, if the technology in question is somehow controversial (such as 
reproductive cloning), a frame of fear and horror is easily applied, evoking the 
Frankenstein myth, as it were.3 A similar polarization tends to be conjured by the 
expert and media portrayal of public sentiments, as in the case of GM food, held by 
British media and expert reports to divide the public into mutually exclusive 
fractions.4  
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Nevertheless, contemporary societies arguably have made the transition into reflexive 
modernity, in which citizens recognize and debate the joint production and 
redistribution of benefits and risks as an inherent aspect of scientific and technological 
advance. Hence, people's sentiments towards genetic technologies are likely to be 
more nuanced, reflexive and ambivalent than what is conveyed by policy debate, mass 
media or even by surveys.5 The marginalization or privatization of reflexivity may in 
part be due to the dominance of technological optimism in the policy discourse about 
healthcare and genetic research. Despite evidence about the shortcomings of the so-
called ‘deficit model’, second thoughts and reservation regarding genetic technologies 
are frequently de-legitimised in public debate by blaming them on ignorance. But 
marginalization may also be an artefact of reporting, as mainstream media rendering 
of quantitative surveys does not easily capture complex reasoning, nuanced 
sentiments or ambivalence.  
 
This paper presents an exploration of reflexivity through a qualitative study among 
individuals knowledgeable and prima facie supportive of human genetics in Iceland. 
We believe this task to be important. Discrepancies between lay and expert perception 
of human genetic technology, and more subtly, between real and presumed 
perceptions, may easily translate into an erosion of public legitimacy similar to that 
which has shaken the governance of related technologies in recent years.6 Further, 
unacknowledged reflexivity will not feed into processes of governance, increasing the 
danger that technology will cause more harm than benefit. This raises the need to 
understand the public understanding of genetics as well as the democratic challenges 
of developing inclusive governance taking that understanding into account.  
 
In Iceland, the private enterprise Decode genetics has collected data from more than 
50% of the adult population for their research into the genetic components of many 
common diseases, including myocardial infarction, schizophrenia and asthma. 
Following a fierce debate locally and internationally in 1997-2000 about Decode's 
plans for a nation-wide database with comprehensive healthcare information, the 
company recently appears to have achieved a favourable position in the Icelandic 
social and cultural imagery.7 According to a Eurobarometer conducted in 2005, the 
Icelandic public is more supportive of biobank research and biotechnology than 
people in any other European country,8 and according to the company itself more than 
90% of the public respond favourably when asked to contribute to Decode's research 
projects.9 Our hypothesis was that eliciting reflections in this setting, among 
individuals knowledgeable and supportive of human genetic research, would allow a 
philosophical-anthropological analysis of different and potentially conflicting 
meanings attached to genetic technologies, in particular with respect to personal 
health risk management. Accordingly, we performed focus group interviews about the 
impact of human genetics on everyday life with scientists working with Decode 
genetics, as well as with individuals who recently had contributed to Decode's 
research, i.e. donors of blood samples and personal information.  
 
This study forms part of a larger investigation into the reactions to Decode genetics 
and the governance of human genetics in Iceland.10 It is our opinion that the challenge 
of reflexive modernity is to pass into pre hoc anticipation of higher-level effects of 
genetics to improve the governance of novel technologies. By ‘higher level effects’ 
we mean the socio-cultural repercussions of genetic research and the associated 
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technologies. Before presenting and discussing the results of our focus group 
interviews, we will outline a general framework for the higher-level effects of science 
and technology as found in the work of Brian Wynne, followed by a brief account of 
Stan van Hooft’s theory of health, which we take to provide a useful conceptualisation 
of some of the most central dimensions of culture interrelated with the current rise of 




Wynne writes that public reactions to science and technology concern not only the 
concrete facts, proposals and applications, but also the ‘prescriptive messages’ of 
technological projects.11 These are value-laden messages about human agency, the 
nature of human existence, the role of science in the broad context of everyday life, 
etc., that accompany science and technology as their presuppositions or implications. 
The transmission of such messages is a hermeneutic process, resulting not only from 
more or less deliberate intentions originating in expert institutions, but also through a 
dialectic of lay interpretations, reflecting a variety of knowledge, values, fears and 
hopes. According to Wynne, public interpretation of the prescriptive models of human 
agency and risk management is germane to the public critique of science, as in the 
case of, say, hostility towards GM food and crops and technological solutions to 
environmental pollution.12 
 
Following Wynne’s line of reasoning, the subtleties of public perceptions of human 
genetic technologies are directly relevant to the implications of these technologies on 
health and health care. Already from Thomas’ and Thomas’ classic theorem, “If men 
define situations as real, they are real in their consequences”,13 it follows that public 
perception will feed back into real action in society. In particular, we expect the 
practical lifeworld consequences of these technologies to be broader than the face-
value clinical utility, and to depend upon the ways in which they are understood and 
integrated into thoughts, expectations and actions. This integration is crucially linked 
with what Wynne calls prescriptive messages, and will depend upon a large number of 
factors including scientists’, stakeholders’ and media’s appearance in terms of 
trustworthiness, competency and responsibility. However, integration also has to be 
seen as an essentially open-ended and unpredictable process in which the public and 
society perform a creative translatory work upon the technologies, their prescriptive 
messages, and their own world-views and value systems.  
 
A central lifeworld dimension involved in the rise of human genetics is health itself. 
By promising and providing new knowledge about disease mechanisms, risk, and the 
potential consequences of a person’s attitudes towards genetic tests, lifestyle and 
reproduction, genetics unleashes an unlimited number of intended and unintended 
‘messages’ which interact with people’s thoughts, actions, relationships and identities. 
Conversely, contemporary beliefs about human agency, disease and the power of 
medical interventions form the cultural environment which enables and gives shape to 
the rapid development of genetics. To deal with certain features of this interaction, we 
shall apply the broad concept of health developed by van Hooft, in which health is 
seen as inseparable from human subjectivity and as such inherently value-laden and 
conditioned by the particularity of individual persons, embedded in the language and 
culture of late modernity.14 The crucial feature of van Hooft’s account in our context 
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is that it expands the biomedical model of health by identifying four levels of 
subjectivity, referring to different aspects of human existence, from molecule to the 
meaning of life, where suffering and loss of health may arise. The first level is the 
biological and concerns the functioning of organs, tissues and molecules. The second, 
relational, level denotes the ways in which we relate to reality through perception and 
interpretation, depending on largely unconscious processes of meaning-construction. 
The third, pragmatic, level concerns people’s ability to fulfill social roles and plan 
their lives. The fourth level, integration, denotes our need for self-understanding, 
purpose and belonging, our dependence on community and narratives that help us 
commit ourselves and see life as worthwhile. Although the three non-biological levels 
of health can be distinguished from each other for analytical purposes, in reality they 
tend to be integrated with each other and with the biological dimension. For our 
present purpose, distinguishing the non-biological dimensions of health from 
biological health will be crucial. It is easy to see that activities focusing solely on one 
level may result in unanticipated effects on a different level. Indeed, the history of 
medicine bears evidence of numerous instances where medical interventions 
effectively targeting the biological level also had unpredicted health effects on the 
three other levels. Certain quarantine and eugenic practices are but two examples of 
practices that were abolished not primarily because they were ineffective or harmful 
to health on the biological level, but because they were found to have detrimental 
effects on the three other levels. Also, a significant reason for the current rise of 
alternative therapies in societies with advanced biomedical healthcare services seems 
to be the tendency of biomedical practices to focus on the biological, while not 
adequately addressing higher levels of subjectivity. With regard to human genetics, a 
challenge of reflexive modernity is to develop the means to conceptualise and 
evaluate the higher-level effects of these technologies.  
 
Method and material 
 
As the aim of the study was to search for ambivalence and reflexivity among 
individuals who in one way or another were committed to the utility of human 
genetics, we chose to interview these individuals in focus groups of 4-5 participants 
each. While the group setting provides a dynamics and a certain anonymity as 
compared with individual interviews, these small groups were more suitable for 
establishing the trust needed to discuss ambivalence than the conventional focus 
groups of 6-12 participants would have been. 13 scientists working with Decode were 
purposefully selected to achieve a fertile exchange of opinions and beliefs. To 
complement this material, we recruited four consecutive individuals among those 
volunteering blood samples and healthcare information to Decode.15  
 
Focus group interviews lasting two hours were carried out by SH in four groups; two 
groups of 4 and one consisting of 5 scientists, the last one consisting of the 4 lay 
participants. A semi-structured approach was used, based on a short interview guide 
and basic principles for focus group interviews. The informants were asked to discuss 
any likely consequence of human genetic research in the lives of ‘ordinary people’. 
They were encouraged to use examples from their own experience, and it was 
explained that the aim of the discussion was to explore rather than necessarily to agree 
on any definite views of the topic given. The interview guide included a strong 
commitment to take seriously any suggestions and points of view submitted by the 
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informants, i.e. encouraging an earnest discussion of their merits, the relationship 
between different suggestions, etc. 
 
The interviews with the scientists were conducted in English, while the lay participant 
interview was conducted in Icelandic. Full audiotape recordings were transcribed 
verbatim, with the recording from the lay participant interview being translated into 
English at the time of transcription. All transcripts were coded for emerging themes 
by SH and then analysed. The transcripts were subsequently coded and analysed by 
RS, and finally all three investigators agreed on a common interpretation after trying 
diverging interpretations against each other as well as against the theoretical 
framework, also seeking to take account of how the investigators' preconceptions 




The results are presented under three headings, each section being introduced by 
typical quotes from the interviews. 
 
1.  Benefits, with epistemological, clinical and practical limitations 
 
There is so much hope that this will be the key to everything. But I 
think we will never get there. You know, we are hoping that this 
could be a good diagnostic tool, that we will be able to develop 
drugs for everything that we will be able to diagnose. And then to 
correct diseases with gene therapy... If we’re talking say 15-20 years 
we will know maybe a little bit more about things and … but I think 
to be able to cure things … it’s far, far away from us. Even though 
we have all those tools it’s going to be … But it can be helpful in 
some cases to be able to, like with pharmacogenomics to be able to 
tailor the drug therapy. ... I think the steps are all going to be very 
small. For example with the human genome project, when, you 
know, all the human DNA had been sequenced, people really hoped 
that it would, you know, open the door to almost everything. But it is 
a very small, minor step … that we just know the letters in there, but 
we don’t know what they mean (scientist). 
 
Our informants – lay and scientists – all expressed the view that human genetics will 
bring great benefits to healthcare. The scientists were enthusiastic that their research 
was showing promising results, and they were confident that research will translate 
into healthcare benefits. The lay participants stated without hesitation that the research 
they were contributing to was important. This was the unmistakable ‘baseline’ point 
of view among our informants, and a major finding against which our subsequent 
results have to be evaluated. The reservations, concerns, second thoughts and 
ambivalence that we present below gain their relevance against this background. 
 
Scientists and lay participants alike were unanimous that progress would be slow, as 
the way from basic genetic research to substantial clinical benefit is long and tortuous. 
The informants identified and discussed a catalogue of epistemological, clinical and 
practical limitations of genetic prediction and preventive measures derived from 
genetic information. Here, we will focus mainly on predictive testing. 
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First, the epistemological value of predictive information derived from genetic testing 
will be limited, especially when it comes to testing for complex diseases and traits: 
Several scientists stated that it is “quite clear that predictions are uncertain” in the 
sense that even if an individual is found to carry a genetic disposition for a given 
disease it is far from certain that he or she is going to develop that disease. As an 
example of this, if Decode or others were to identify a genetic polymorphism 
correlated with alcohol abuse, there would be “a lot of people with this alcoholism-
gene who are not alcoholics”, according to one of the lay participants. 
 
Secondly, it follows from the epistemological characteristics of predictive information 
that using this information as the basis of clinically relevant advice about lifestyle and 
preventive treatment is not straightforward. It is clearly a problem that diagnostic and 
prognostic technologies tend to be introduced ahead of evidence of their accuracy or 
the effectiveness of intervention. In addition it is unlikely that any preventive 
treatment will completely eliminate a given genetic risk. Also, a negative test result 
does not mean zero risk, and therefore leading a healthy life is important in any case. 
There will be uncertainty about potential genetic risks that have not been mapped, as 
stated by a scientist talking about a disease which runs in his family: “I would just be 
thinking ‘is there another gene?’” The scientists agreed that making sense of genetic 
information and turning it into wise choices in everyday life would remain a hard task 
for most people, especially as information becomes more complex. When provided 
with information about multiple risk factors, people will have a hard time figuring out 
and adapting to the information: “[O]ne can wonder to what extent people will be able 
to understand these tests and to make use of them”. The scientists also expected that 
the importance of genetic predispositions would be overestimated in some instances: 
“Some people might just go to bed and think, well my life is over, I have a three times 
risk of getting …” Some of the scientists wondered optimistically whether 
information technology could be used to ‘translate’ genetic information so that people 
could form appropriate opinions despite lacking the background knowledge necessary 
to evaluate the technical details of risk estimation and risk reduction. Then again, not 
everyone has the motivation to change lifestyle in accordance with medical evidence. 
Actually, the general knowledge that people should exercise, and avoid smoking and 
excessive consumption of food is available to everyone already, and still the lifestyle 
of the general public in most societies is becoming unhealthier by the minute. Some of 
the scientists wondered that this unfortunate trend might escalate as it becomes 
coupled with widespread use of lifestyle drugs designed to minimise the risk imposed 
by self-indulgence and inheritance. Unfortunately, the scientists said, many “people 
would rather ‘pop a pill’ than go to the gym”. The misgivings of the scientists were 
largely corroborated by the lay participants. The avalanche of information from 
genetic research will be “an extremely large package” to people, as one of them put it. 
 
2.  Impact on dignity, tolerance and justice 
 
When these individuals disappear from society, it will be: I'm 
precious ... my own needs. It will fail ... the sense of humanity. All 
this raises the need to sort out in general what is quality of life (lay 
participant). 
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The lay participants expressed a concern that genetic testing in pregnancy will 
increase the pressure to ‘eliminate’ abnormal foetuses. Although Decode has 
emphasised technologies targeting postnatal prediction and prevention of disease, the 
lay participants found it natural to include a discussion about reproductive 
technologies and suggested that dignity and humaneness are linked with diversity and 
tolerance in ways which make it dangerous for society to systematically ‘eliminate’ 
deviant individuals such as dwarfs and people with Downs syndrome. 
 
The lay participants also wondered whether genetic research, although potentially 
useful, should be prioritised above other measures. When preventive measures based 
on genetic technologies are introduced, some people are going to demand them 
regardless of whether they are cost-effective in comparison with other interventions. 
The scientists discussed along the same lines that new technologies are demanding on 
resources, and genetic technologies may add to inequalities in health across social and 
global gradients. The possible creation of a ‘genetic elite’ was discussed, including 
references to popular culture (as in the film ‘Gattaca’) and popular science (as in the 
book ‘Remaking Eden’17). All of this was seen as unjust and unfortunate. 
 
3.  Fighting disease and taking care of one’s own health 
 
I’m thinking about my [children]. How can I tune [their] life to 
avoid the stuff that are true risk factors today? Of course I want to 
understand this better. Give them proper food when they grow up, so 
they won’t have the deficiency or whatever … signalling substance 
(scientist). 
 
And then it's the question ... er ... do you feel any better if you have 
this list from the moment you're born with all the syndromes that 
[starts to laugh quietly, the rest of the group gradually join] ... or, I 
don't know ... or that you might get? You're at high risk for this, and 
this and that. And if you are either going to live by this or oppose it 
and ignore it completely, what the heck, I'll just get everything. I 
don't know if that's a kind of knowledge that would actually be useful 
for one (lay participant).  
 
I think you have to balance the risk factors with what you can call 
the quality of life. You can worry yourself sick if you know too much 
(scientist).  
 
3A.  Medical rationality and the empowering function of knowledge 
 
The scientists sometimes argued as if medical rationality were the ultimate guide to a 
successful life. One should keep informed about one’s dispositions to disease and make 
informed choices about lifestyle and preventive interventions. A scientist who until 
recently had been working as a MD, assured that this was how he used predictive 
information in his work, giving his patients “very concrete instructions about how they 
should behave and not behave in terms of various risk factors.” The scientists said they 
hoped their research would lead to the discovery of genetic dispositions to disease that 
would allow people to take appropriate measures to avoid disease: “If we could identify 
those major players, then people could tailor their life.” They emphasised the 
empowering capacity of predictive knowledge, i.e. that people can be put “in a more 
empowered role of being able to do something about it should they choose so.” 
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The general rule that one should follow medical advice was made more tangible when 
the scientists described how they would like to ‘tailor’ their own life or that of their 
children through use of medications, lifestyle-interventions and specialised diets, once 
“the true risk factors” become known. In one of the groups two female scientists also 
stated that if they were to learn that they were genetically predisposed to osteoporosis, 
they would respond by having their bone mineral density measured more frequently. 
 
3B.  Personal inconsistencies  
 
In discussions about how the scientists themselves were currently dealing with issues 
of risk, it became evident that they are not always compliant with medical rationality 
as described above. For example, two of the scientists submitted that they were not 
having their cholesterol measured, even if they were positive that this would be 
prudent. Similarly, it was not always clear to the scientists that they would choose to 
avail themselves of preventive medications, though they expressed enthusiasm and 
support for research programmes designed to develop such therapies. For example, 
one of the scientists stated that she probably would not wish to take medications to 
prevent stroke, in spite of the fact that several of her older relatives have suffered 
from that disease: “I'm dying to know if I have that haplotype or not, but what I would 
do with it? I would not really change my life or anything. But would I take a pill to 
prevent ... based on that haplotype? No.” In much the same way, the lay participant 
group was not willing to conclude that the teenage daughter of one of the participants 
would be better off knowing about whatever genetic dispositions she might be 
carrying. 
 
The discursive devices employed by the scientists to explain apparent inconsistencies 
between the ideal of medical rationality and their own choices, included judgements 
about “stupidity and laziness”, failure to make one’s priorities correctly or 
inconvenience. These explanations were frequently coloured by laughter, signalling as 
well as containing unease about one’s own shortcomings.  
 
3C.  The limits of medical rationality 
 
On several occasions scientists and lay participants alike described potentially 
harmful effects of predictive knowledge and extensive preventive measures, and 
stated that prediction and prevention must not be made the only measure of how 
people lead their lives. This point of view is summarised in the following quote from 
one of the lay participants: “I think that people are going to ignore it, or I hope so 
[starts to laugh, quietly, the others gradually join the laughter]. That people don’t live 
totally by … Because you have got to have a little freedom.” The scientists were clear 
that no matter how sophisticated technologies that are developed, we will “never be 
free of the worries of being human with all its complications”. Striving to eliminate 
every single worry will bring more misery than benefit. It did not become clear, 
however, under what circumstances this misery would outweigh the benefits of 
genetic technologies; and suggestions were made that people will gradually ‘adapt’ 
and learn how to make use of new information. In the following quote this is being 
discussed by a lay participant, but even here the use of laughter and the choice of 
Alzheimer’s disease as an example seems to signal the unresolved nature of ‘adapting’ 
to predictive genetic knowledge: 
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I think that one would just accommodate, just as everyone 
accommodates to knowing … well we know that eventually everyone 
is going to get some disease.  It always takes time to adapt to what is 
new, but I think that one would just be glad to know that yes, I’m at 
risk for this. Then you’d be waiting for the first symptoms [starts to 
laugh] yes [laughs louder, the others join]. Then you’d know what it 




Although our informants demonstrated an ability to identify and discuss complex 
issues and concerns regarding the future of genetics, they may hold other beliefs on 
these topics than we have been able to elicit from these particular dialogues. Most 
obviously, the scientists may have had a strategic motive – perhaps encouraged by the 
interests of their employer – in portraying themselves as socially and morally 
responsible. Making a likeable and sympathetic impression is important to most 
people, and the scientists as well as the lay participants may have estimated that we – 
the investigators – as well as the future readership of this report would approve if they 
gave the impression that they were concerned about potential harm caused by 
genetics. As stated above, however, we have approached our informants with a strong 
commitment to take seriously their arguments and stances, and in the following we 
will pursue the lines of thought communicated in the interviews without further 
speculation about vested interests. 
 
Taking Wynne’s idea about the prescriptive content of science and technology as our 
point of departure, the question to be answered is what we have learnt about how our 
informants relate to the prescriptive messages of human genetics. As indicated above, 
the organising principle of our results is that this relationship is characterised by an 
ambivalent mixture of enthusiasm, second thoughts and reservations. We will now 
discuss certain features of this mixture. 
 
Our informants’ general enthusiasm about the benefits of human genetics and the 
scientists’ ideas about personal lifestyle choices and preventive treatment presented in 
section 3A illustrate a particular prescriptive model of human agency and the 
measures that should be taken to avoid disease. According to this model individuals 
are endowed with the capacity to make rational decisions based on objective 
knowledge about what is to their advantage or disadvantage. Based on predictive 
knowledge about their predispositions to disease, individuals are obliged by reason to 
make such decisions as minimise the likelihood that they fall ill. Each person’s life 
should be ‘tailored’ with the aim of securing his or her health, and this is done by 
making the right lifestyle choices and benefiting from preventive medications in order 
to minimise specific disease risks. This prescriptive model, which we will label 
‘rational lifestyle choice’ has strong foothold in research and healthcare policy in 
Western societies, and is part of the cultural milieu hosting and encouraging the rise of 
human genetics. 
 
Already the acknowledgement of the limitations of predictive knowledge presented in 
section 1 of the results betrays that our informants are aware that this prescriptive 
model has serious limitations. Presupposing that people will make rational lifestyle 
choices based on information about a multitude of risks, that they enjoy the capacities 
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needed to make all the ‘right’ choices, etc., runs counter to the common knowledge 
that awareness of lifestyle influences on health does not in itself guarantee that people 
‘tailor’ their lives towards ‘minimal risk’. In general, the very belief that there is a 
‘right’ way of using genetic information, and the assumption that people can and will 
use genetic information in the ‘right’ way, are problematic. This emerges from the 
probabilistic nature of genetic information18 and the effects genetic technologies may 
have on the non-biological dimensions of health discussed by van Hooft. While 
genetic testing and preventive regimes increasingly provide opportunities for 
countering biological disease, the crucial insight is that these regimes also have the 
potential to interfere with the autonomous self-expression and spontaneity of 
individuals and societies which are essential ingredients of health in the non-
biological sense described by van Hooft. Deciding which are the ‘right’ conclusions 
concerning the use of preventive regimes based on genetic technologies is therefore 
likely to be a much more complex task than suggested by the prescriptive model of 
rational lifestyle choice. 
 
The results presented in section 2 demonstrate our informants’ attempts to explore 
how the prescriptive model implied in their most enthusiastic interpretation of 
genetics may impact other values and prescriptive beliefs, in particular the social 
virtues of dignity, tolerance and justice. Even if human genetics will increasingly 
improve biological health for privileged individuals, there is a danger of reduced 
tolerance of diversity and more generally a threat to the sense of meaning in people’s 
lives, placing human dignity and sociality at peril. Under certain conditions the poor 
and underprivileged are likely to suffer increased injustice and deprivation in 
comparison with people enjoying good access to new genetic technologies. Although 
our informants did not dismiss genetic research on these grounds, or even conclude 
that human genetics is bound to cause intolerance and injustice, their discussion 
nevertheless illustrates that these adverse effects may occur, particularly if enthusiasm 
for human genetics is unrestricted and based on a particular set of prescriptive beliefs, 
valuing individual ‘tailoring’, risk reduction and enhancement to conform with 
narrowly conceived concepts of health and success. Thus, our results indicate that 
both lay people and scientists strongly in favour of genetic research and technology 
development, see the prescriptions of a narrow medical rationality as inadequate if 
genetic technologies are to be compatible with human dignity, tolerance and justice. 
 
In sections 3B and 3C second thoughts and ambivalence are brought closer to our 
informants and their personal points of view. Some of the scientists betrayed that they 
were not personally following the lifestyle obligations to which they were otherwise 
eager to claim support. And neither the scientists nor the lay participants were certain 
that they would change their lifestyle or take medications in accordance with 
predictive knowledge based on genetic tests in the future. Within the rational choice 
model this amounts to nothing less than foolishness, and it is therefore understandable 
that our informants reacted by making fun of themselves and each others on these 
occasions. Especially for the scientists, any apparent failure to adhere to ‘scientific 
standards’ can easily become a cause of embarrassment. Acknowledging and 
underscoring one’s humanness by use of laughter and similar devices can be a way of 
glossing over or implicitly explaining one’s failure in everyday life to adhere to a 
scientific worldview, of which the rational choice model is an integral part. 
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The points of view presented in section 3C constitute the most explicit reservations in 
the face of the prescriptive model of rational lifestyle choice found in our interviews. 
Here our informants, who through their enthusiastic work or through unselfish 
donations are committed to the idea that human genetics can provide relief and 
improve health, are explicit in their reservations against a lifestyle where prevention 
and ‘tailoring’ are the supreme measure of how one should lead one’s life. 
Interestingly, ambivalence and reservations in the face of enthusiasm appear to be 
inherent features of their positions, rather than a temporary state of doubt to be 
resolved by an argument either in favour or in disfavour of human genetics.  
 
Taking our lead from the statements “you have got to have a little freedom” and “you 
can worry yourself sick if you know too much”, we believe that the ambivalent stance 
demonstrated by our informants can be explained in the light of van Hooft’s theory of 
health. Human subjectivity is constituted not only by biology, but by the ways the 
organism relates to its environment, constructs meaning, partakes in social 
relationships and commits itself to certain ways of living, and genetic technologies 
designed to prevent or combat organic disease, can interfere with health on all these 
different levels. Thus, our informants’ ambivalence can be understood as the logical 
consequence of reacting to genetics on two or more health levels at the same time: 
They are enthusiastic that genetic technologies can be useful to avert disease, but 
simultaneously suspicious that extensive predicting and ‘tailoring’ can have 
unintended and unfortunate effects on the creative processes involved in maintaining 
relatedness, purpose and meaning. Further, scientists and lay participants alike 
conducted their non-conclusive negotiations between contradictory opinions and 
sentiments in a quite identical manner, indicating perhaps that the basic requirements 
for assigning a meaningful and beneficial lifeworld role to medical technologies are 
shared by all subjects, and are not strongly influenced by technical expertise in the 
field in question. As reported in section 3A the prescriptive model of rational lifestyle 
choice emerged most clearly from the dialogue among the scientists, but their 
commitment to this model was balanced by equally strong statements of reservation, 
ambivalence and non-adherence indistinguishable from those of the lay participants. 
 
As genetics is currently held to be among the most promising venues of research to 
further enhance the power of medical interventions against disease, pain and 
disability, any second thoughts about human genetics can be seen as spitting in the 
face of medicine’s technical miracles. Further, medicine is thoroughly embedded in a 
scientific parlance of objectivity and disenchantment. Non-biological levels of health 
on the other hand, being intrinsically dependent on cultural and subjective 
interpretation, do hardly lend themselves to rigorous analysis and experimentation. 
Suggestions that genetics could be harmful to health – to meaning, agency, belonging, 
etc. – can therefore easily be dismissed as unscientific speculation, not suitable for 
rational validation or refutation, and therefore sheer nonsense. The very idea that 
regimes which effectively combat disease can be harmful to health is probably 
counter-intuitive to many. Our suggestion is that this results from the biological one-
dimensionality of Western medical and scientific epistemology: By neglect, this 
epistemology and the corresponding prescriptive beliefs currently in circulation do not 
distinguish, hence do not weigh benefits (or losses) on the biological dimension of 
disease against losses (or benefits) on non-biological levels of health. Implicitly, 
health is treated as a non-existent dimension in life; or rather the concept of health is 
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reduced to imply merely the absence of disease, or the ‘normal’ functioning of 
organs.19  
 
Conventional risk communication has been shown to be at best an imperfect method 
for recruiting the general public to the regimes of preventive medicine. This has given 
rise to the understanding that individuals’ and populations’ health needs, values and 
aspirations must be explored as they provide the context within which the merits of 
medical technologies are to be established. Thus, it is an implication of our study that 
the non-biological dimensions of health should be taken into account when judging 
the proper role to be assigned to human genetic technologies.20 
 
While our informants discussed the material costs of new technologies and the 
intellectual challenges involved in interpreting estimates of disease susceptibility, it 
seems to us that cultural resources in a broader sense may be equally important for 
people’s ability to make sense of genetics. The decisions people make regarding their 
health are a product of their knowledge, imagination and sensitivity, vulnerable to 
anxiety, lack of insight and social support. Information and choices that may empower 
the privileged who have access to cultural resources to sort out their options, may be 
misinterpreted by others, causing suffering, loss of sense of good life, etc. Thus, one 
of the reasons why health is strongly related to class and social status21 appears to be 
that people need freedom, knowledge and social support to take good care of their 
health and to benefit from healthcare. We submit that this hinges on, among other 
things, people’s ability to balance any unintended and unfavourable effects of medical 
technologies on the non-biological dimensions of health against their intended and 
favourable effect against biological disease.  
 
In the face of van Hooft’s model of health, it should be stressed that there is no way of 
knowing a priori the size or the sign of effects of genetic technologies on non-
biological levels of health. Indeed, returning to Tomas’ and Thomas’ theorem, it 
becomes clear that the public reception of genetic technologies in itself is medically 
relevant. And if the higher-level effects of new technologies are dependent on the 
cultural interpretation of the same technologies, the task of exploring and evaluating 
the higher-level effects of human genetics takes a creative turn: In addition to its 
analytical part, we need to mobilise the cultural and governance resources which will 
ensure the compatibility of genetic technologies with the full range of human 
subjectivity and health. This might produce some rather startling effects. Perhaps the 
private discourses of ambivalence and reflexivity may be regarded as a resource for 
the development of the required adaptation: their significance in this respect needs 
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Africa must come on board the genomics bandwagon 
 




With the completion and the success of the unraveling of the human and some non-
human genetic codes comes the optimism that science, once again, is at the threshold 
of transforming human existence in an unprecedented way. The sequencing of the 
human genome with the science and technology by which it occurs is seen as a 
potential gateway to man's final conquest of most of the health and health related 
disorders that have for long plagued the human race. 
 
While some developing nations like Cuba, Mexico and India have taken the initiative 
to be major players in the genomics arena by exploring its potentials towards 
enhancing improved quality of life for their citizens, the majority of others, especially 
in Africa, still occupy the spectators' seat. If this apparent lukewarm attitude 
continues, it implies that the present dependence on the developed nations as remote 
beneficiaries of gains of scientific breakthroughs will persist. It also means that the 
expectation that genomics should, among other benefits, re-dress the inequalities of 
access to health care between the rich and poor nations may be a mirage for a long 
time to come. 
 
The expected benefits from the human genome project and genomics technologies are 
fascinating and hold the ace for improving the standards of living of the African 
people. However, these expectations are futuristic, time-dependent and capital 
intensive. They require commitments of national governments to policy re-orientation 
about research and development, strategic planning, resource mobilization, priority 
setting; and establishing, promoting and sustaining enabling environments for 
scientific and technological breakthrough. No doubt, there is dire need for assistance 
from the developed and the frontline developing nations in this regard. However, great 
initiatives and deep commitments to making significant scholarly contributions to the 





The Human Genome Project, straddling the close of the 20th and the beginning of the 
21st centuries, is at the threshold of changing human thinking both in the way we look 
at the past and in the way we view the future. Genomics has the potential to unravel 
the mystery of past existence, modify our understanding of present events and re-
direct our focus on things that enhance the future good of humanity. Though its 
applications and uses appear to be more direct to medicine and human health, it has 
the potential to transform human civilization beyond the confines of biomedicine. The 
discovery of antibiotics in the early part of the last century marked the beginning of 
the march towards the conquest of infectious diseases resulting in total eradication of 
some and complete control of others, especially in the developed world. Genomics is 
to this century what infectious disease and discovery of antibiotics were to the last.1 
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The potentials of genomics, however, transcend those of antibiotics in that it holds 
promises to revolutionize our knowledge about the management and control of both 
infectious and non-infectious diseases. 
 
Of particular importance is the relevance of genomics and its tools to narrowing the 
health gap between rich and poor nations and enhancing reasonable access to simple, 
cheap and effective health services in developing countries.2 In view of this potential, 
calls have been made to less developed countries of the world not to stand by in the 
mistaken impression that genomics is of and for the developed world. Some 
developing nations like Cuba, Mexico and India have risen up to the challenge and 
have taken the initiative to be major players in the genomics arena by exploring its 
potentials towards enhancing improved quality of life for their citizens.3 However, 
many countries of Africa excluding South Africa, Egypt and perhaps one or two 
others, still lag behind. It is imperative that African nations emulate the examples of 
the developing countries that have assumed frontline positions in genomics. 
  
In a foresight study of the ways in which genomics is likely to affect the third world, 
Daar et al identify top ten technologies for improving health in developing countries.4 
Prominent on the list is the use of genomics biotechnology to confront the menace of 
infectious diseases through development of simple and affordable diagnostic methods; 
development of vaccines and efficient delivery systems; and identification of new 
antimicrobials and drug targets. The list also includes application of genomics to 
improving agricultural yields and enhancing a clean environment. Pang and many 
others support the view that genomics would enhance the control of infectious and 
non-infectious diseases on a global scale. Further more, sequencing of the rice 
genome offers opportunities for improved yield and more nutritious value for the 
three billion people, mainly in the developing world, who depend on rice as their 
staple diet.5 6 These and many others express the common view that genomics could 
be a veritable tool for improving health and living standards in developing countries. 
This paper focuses on developing African nations using Nigeria with immense 
potentials as a prototype, not only to contribute to the genomics breakthroughs, but 
also to reap from its windfall. It explores why African nations should not lag behind 
other developing nations of the world in exploring the genomics landscape and 




The situation: Nigeria as a prototype 
  
With a population of 130 million people, an annual growth rate of about 2.8%, more 
than 250 ethnic groups and over 300 dialects and languages, Nigeria is the most 
populous and most culturally diverse black nation in the world. One in two West 
Africans and one among six Africans is a Nigerian. The country emerged from the 
ruins of a civil war in the late sixties and early seventies to a dawn of a new era 
signaled by the discovery of abundant petroleum oil reserve in the Niger delta. This 
discovery resulted in total abandonment of the agriculture sector which had hitherto 
been the mainstay of the economy, and an over-dependence on the capital-intensive 
oil sector, which now provides almost all of foreign exchange earnings. What began 
as an “oil boom” with a lot of potentials for development and a strong foreign 
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exchange earning capacity and economic base for the country later became an 
albatross which may now be looked back upon as an “oil doom”. A combination of 
failure to further develop other sectors of the economy, over-dependence on petro-
dollar, military mis-adventure in power with consequent destruction of the moral 
fabrics of the society and an enthronement of systemic corruption, mismanagement, 
inflation, political unrest and ethno-religious conflicts, has produced a state with a 
GDP per capita income of about US $300. 
 
However, except for a few setbacks which are reminiscent of a long period of military 
rule, the return of participatory democracy in Nigeria in the past six years has brought 
about significant re-orientation of the body polity. The relatively stable political 
climate should provide a springboard for an all round development and an incentive 
for investment in science and technology. Though the potential gains of genomics 
technology are still a long way to reach even in the technologically advanced 
countries of the west, it is imperative for resource- poor and less technologically 
advanced nations to join forces with others now. They must not wait till the gains 
become tangible, otherwise those benefits would be out of their reach and the present 
status quo of disparity in distribution of the gains of science and technology in health 
would remain, and even worsen. Nigeria and the whole of Africa stand to benefit in 




Infant and child mortality rates are basic indicators of the socioeconomic development 
of a country and the quality of life of its people. Specifically, infant mortality (which 
is the probability of dying before the first birthday) in Nigeria is highest when 
compared with some countries from different geographic zones of the world (Figure 
1). In the period from 2000 to 2005, while the infant mortality rates in most of these 
countries (except South Africa and Iran) have fallen consistently, the rate increased 
from 74.18 to 98.8 per 1000 live births in the same time period in Nigeria.7 The high 
prevalence of communicable but preventable diseases like malaria, dysentery, 
pneumonia and measles contributes significantly to high childhood mortality and 
morbidity rates in Nigeria. Besides these are other infectious diseases like typhoid, 
amoebiasis, guinea worm, helminthiasis, tuberculosis and hepatitis which also cause 
considerable mortality and morbidity in both adults and children. While most of these 
communicable diseases have been eradicated or controlled in the developed and some 
developing countries, they still constitute a major health hazard in Nigeria and most 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Moreover, a significant proportion of Nigerians have genetic disorders such as sickle 
cell anaemia and glucose 6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency or their traits. In 
addition to the burden posed by infectious and genetic diseases is the epidemiological 
transition which Nigeria, like many other developing countries is undergoing.5 
Hypertension and diabetes presently affect about 10% and 2.75% of the population 
respectively, but prevalence rates of these diseases are rising.8 The incidence of breast 
cancer appears to have stabilized and is perhaps declining in some western countries, 
whereas it has been increasing in those societies that hitherto had a low incidence 
including Nigeria.9 Regrettably, little or no attention is given to these time-dependent 
fatal diseases some of which are hinged on lifestyle and behaviour. 
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How genomics (proteomics, pharmacogenomics etc) might help the situation 
 
One of the promising benefits of the knowledge of human and non-human animal 
genomes is the application of technology to enhance the health of humans in both the 
developed and the developing worlds. As is shown above, the major causes of 
morbidity and mortality in Nigeria and most African countries are preventable, 
treatable and controllable. Most of these diseases present a formidable prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment triad. Apart from an efficient public health system and a 
positive attention to personal and environmental hygiene by the people, the only other 
significant means of curtailing the spread of these communicable diseases is an 
effective vaccination programme. Hitherto the different vaccination programmes and 
efforts in Nigeria for example, are far from being universally successful, adequate or 
effective.  In spite of the fact that most of the vaccines are supplied free by donor 
nations and agencies, and are provided free to the public, some other extenuating 
factors like difficulty with maintaining an unbroken cold chain, non-oral route of 
administration and cumbersome dosing schedules militate against effective 
vaccination against the killer diseases. It is hoped that advancements in genomics and 
DNA based vaccine production would result in developing vaccines whose 
availability, storage and administration will bypass or overcome most of the hurdles 
hitherto encountered in immunization programmes. The prospect of utilization of 
plant science as a new vehicle for vaccine delivery holds good promise for Nigeria 
and the whole of Africa.10 11  
 
Vector control through genetic modification and biochemical targets offers a 
promising approach in the battle for conquest of many diseases. At the Africa Human 
Genome Initiative Conference in South Africa in March 2003, Gordon Dougan, 
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Director, Centre of Molecular Microbiology and Infection, Imperial College, United 
Kingdom, told participants who came from African countries: “Don't be hypnotised 
by technology, vaccines can be produced with relatively simple technology within 
five years..”12 Talking about developing vaccine against typhoid infection, he said: 
“There is no great mind boggling technology involved in this - it is relatively simple, 
so don't be scared of it.”12 
 
Another major health hurdle is the diagnostic difficulties that clinicians and laboratory 
scientists encounter which make pathogen isolation an arduous task and which 
invariably delay institution of definitive drug therapy. The new biotechnology would 
facilitate development of simple, rapid and high precision diagnostic tools which 
would be available and applicable in the developing countries where they are most 
needed and where there is a ready market for them. Presently most new drug research 
and development are done in western nations and of all the 1233 drugs in the market 
between 1975 and 1999, only 13 were for diseases that are prevalent in the tropical 
countries.13 Through pharmacogenomics and with the increasing knowledge of the 
genetics of diseases and the genetic variations among groups of peoples, it should be 
possible to develop new drugs against many tropical diseases. Such drugs would be 
selective, efficacious, safe and better tolerated. Moreover, in a continent  where 
trauma and thermal burns with large wounds from vehicular and fire accidents are 
rampant, biotechnology holds a promise for developing living cultured skin for 




Farming remains a major income-generating occupation of many urban and rural 
dwellers in Africa. Many people engage in farming as a means of supplementing their 
meager income or providing food for their households and extended family members; 
while some others practice farming as a commitment to a long family tradition. Apart 
from having a favourable agro-climatic condition, it is estimated that Nigeria has a 
cultivable land area of 71.2 million hectares and an agricultural population of about 
38 million people. This agricultural population is said to be 3 times the combined 
agricultural populations of Japan, USA and the UK.16 17 Arguably more than 50% of 
Africa’s active labour force is employed in agriculture. As alluded to above, Nigeria 
had been a world class producer of cash crops such as cocoa, palm produce, rubber 
and groundnut before the oil boom era of the 1970s. 
 
In spite of this potential of becoming an agricultural giant in Africa, Danladi Kuta, a 
molecular biologist with the Sheda Science and Technology Complex, Abuja, Nigeria 
says Nigeria remains an agricultural dwarf and a low-income food-deficit country.17 
Nigeria does not produce enough to feed its teeming population and imported food 
products worth millions of dollar in the last decade. Many wage earners spend most of 
their income on food alone. According to him, the current agricultural growth rate of 
4.5% is far less than the 10% mark which is the minimum that is required to meet the 
increasing food demand of the nation. The reasons for the country’s low agricultural 
productivity include the fact that the bulk of agricultural production is done by 
resource-poor rural farmers who plant crop varieties with poor yield and that can not 
tolerate water stress or resist insect pests and infestation with nematodes.17 Other 
factors include poor weed control strategies, post-harvest storage constraints and 
largely a non-mechanized farming system.  
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How genetic modification (GM) technology might help the situation 
 
Jacques Diouf, Food And Organization Director-General, states that “biotechnology 
offers opportunities to increase the availability and variety of food, increasing overall 
agricultural productivity while reducing seasonal variations in food supplies.” He 
states further that “the effective transfer of existing technologies to poor rural 
communities and the development of new and safe biotechnologies can greatly 
enhance the prospects for sustainably improving agricultural productivity today and in 
the future”18 Apart from the developing countries of Africa, even in the developed 
countries of the world, there is increasing demand for more and better quality food as 
the world population increases and the quantity and quality of arable land mass 
diminish as a consequence of overcrowding, industrialization, land degradation by 
over tillage and organic pollutants; all leading to “an increasingly fragile natural 
resource base” that will be incapable of providing enough food for the growing world 
population.19  
 
Though there is a global need for improved food quality, the situation becomes more 
precarious in Africa where most under-five deaths are associated with malnutrition. I 
agree with Kuta that an investment in agricultural biotechnology would lead to a 
mitigation of the constraints that presently hinder bumper yields through development 
of herbicide-tolerant transgenic crops, improved crop varieties that can tolerate water 
stress and crops developed with resistance genes to insect pests, nematodes and 
viruses. According to him, glyphosate is a safe and non-residual herbicide, but it is 
non-selective and destroys green plants; hence it has to be sprayed before or just after 
planting the crops thus limiting weed control to the initial phase of cropping. 
However, through GM technology, glyphosate-tolerant soybeans and corn are now 
grown in some developed countries. African farmers would benefit from the 
application of similar technology to locally produced crops like rice, beans and guinea 
corn which are major food crops across the continent. Cowpea, cassava and yam are 
major staple food sources, which are plagued by insect pests, viruses and nematodes. 
Incorporation of pest resistance genes into their genomes is one way of improving 
their survival and enhancing good yield. Further more, development of cyanogen-free 
transgenic cassava and incorporation of gluten genes into cassava will lead to 
improved cassava quality as well as cutting the present foreign exchange spending 
since cassava flour could be substituted for imported flour used in the baking 
industry.17 
 
Environment and bioremediation 
 
The principle of bioremediation has wide applications in developing countries as a 
cheap and effective method for cleaning up the environment through the use of natural 
and genetically engineered microorganisms.4 This technology is of particular benefit 
to Nigeria where sewage disposal, water pollution and petro-chemical oil spillage 
with consequent destruction of natural plant and marine life especially in the Niger 
Delta are major health hazards. In Brazil, the Federal University of Santa Catarina and 
Petrobrás, the Brazilian national oil company jointly address the degradation of 
benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene (BTEX) from gasoline spills by 
phytoremediation, a bioremediation process that uses plants.20 By investing in 
biotechnology, the Nigerian government would be providing the initiative for the 
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several multi-national oil companies operating in the Niger Delta to team up with 





Change of mindset  
 
The initiatives for change have to come from within Africa and not only from without. 
The hitherto lukewarm attitude of African governments to research and development 
has to give way to informed commitment by governments and all stakeholders. 
Proactive steps and critical policy shifts should move the continent from being a 
recipient of technology end-products (from the west) and from being a predominantly 
consumer economy to a technologically productive continent. If the developed and the 
up-coming nations of the world have achieved significant momentum in 
biotechnology and are tapping its benefits through concerted efforts of both their 
governments and peoples, the process cannot be otherwise for Africa.  
 
The process should begin by learning from the examples of frontline developing 
countries like Mexico and India, by enacting policies that are backed up with 
legislative power, and by commitment to building a robust infrastructure that is 
immune to political control and manipulation. Governments must provide conducive 
environments, tax incentives, and favourable land lease agreements for local and 
foreign investors that show interest in investing in biotechnology. As is the case in 
South Korea, patent protection incentives should be given to scientists and 
entrepreneurs who venture to invest in biotechnology.21  
 
Comprehensive education program 
 
There is a long phase between scientific and technological breakthroughs and their 
final consumable end products. In this regard a well informed and motivated citizenry 
is a great asset. Public understanding is very important especially with regards to 
information about the eventual end products of genomics and biotechnology, for 
example, the cultural acceptability of GM food. Adequate education programmes are 
needed at all levels to enhance public understanding of the concepts of biotechnology, 
genomics, genetic engineering, genetic testing, genetic research, genetically modified 
food etc. This can be achieved through appropriate utilization of different educational 
programmes, schools, public fora, the news media, NGOs etc. Needless to say that 
molecular biology and genetics should be an integral part of the training of 
physicians, nurses, other health care professionals and biochemical scientists. 
  
Building and strengthening capacity for biotechnology 
 
The success or failure of a scientific innovation or endeavour is critically dependent 
on many factors including the comprehensiveness of the capacity that is acquired 
prior to inception of the project and the mechanism that is put in place for lubricating 
and strengthening the system for on-going efficient and satisfactory performance. 
Presently, pharmaceutical and related industries in Nigeria and most African countries 
do not possess the biotechnological capabilities of the developed world. For example, 
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none of the national crop research institutes in Nigeria has the appropriate facilities 
and the critical mass of scientists for the application of GM technology except at the 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) which is presently developing 
transgenic banana/plantain, cowpea, and cassava.17 Therefore, establishing a solid 
biotechnology base for Africa requires equipping academic centres and research 
institutes with infrastructure for molecular science and technology. Human capacity 
building would be enhanced by establishing scholarships for undergraduates who are 
willing to pursue a career in molecular sciences and by providing funding for graduate 
students to do research in molecular biology, biotechnology, bioinformatics etc. 
Governments should be committed to increasing spending on research and 
development, increasing education budgets at all levels, and prioritizing the teaching 
and learning of mathematics, the sciences and technology as was the case in India 
immediately after independence in 1947,22 and as is presently done in South Africa. 
Moreover, other African nations should emulate the example of South Africa in 
developing and articulating their biotechnology sector to address their specific health 
needs.23  
 
African governments should establish a network of researchers within their countries, 
coordinated regionally or nationally, and launch specific biotechnology development 
targets periodically. Moreover, governments should court the good will of frontline 
developing countries that have made significant progress in the field and seek to 
sponsor academics to fellowship programmes in such countries and also establish 
exchange of researchers with them. Academic institutions should be encouraged to 
pursue collaborations between local and foreign scientists both from developed and 
developing countries. Governments should also midwife industry-institution 
partnerships between the universities or research institutes and pharmaceutical and 
allied industries.  
 
Fostering regional collaborations within African nations 
 
On 3rd May 2004, the Nigerian National Biotechnology Development Agency in 
Abuja, Nigeria, launched the Nigerian Agriculture Biotechnology Project (NABP) and 
the West African Biotechnology Network (WABNET).24 25 According to the Nigerian 
Minister of Science and Technology, the project would help to raise the effectiveness 
and efficiency of bio-resources and biotechnology in Nigeria and West Africa; and 
promote economic growth, ensure sustainable use of the natural resource base, 
enhance the health, environmental, industrial and agricultural development in the sub-
region. This kind of collaboration between Nigeria and its neighbours is akin to the 
Asia-Pacific International Molecular Biology Network (IMBN) and European 
Molecular Biology Organization (EMBO). More of such collaboration is needed in 
Africa in molecular biosciences and biotechnology. It encourages cross fertilization of 
ideas and presents a common front for tackling health and health-related problems 
that are peculiar to the sub-region and continent. Similarity of circumstances would 
make these programmes more relevant and cost effective.25 Given the strategic 
position, the human and economic potentials of Nigeria in the West African sub-
region, this could begin a process of diversifying its economy by exporting 
biotechnological assistance to neighbouring countries that would in turn obtain it 
cheaper than they would from developed nations. 
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Resource mobilization  
The foreseeable gains of genomics are not reliant on biotechnology alone, but also on 
politics and resources.26 Resource mobilization for biotechnology involves a re-
prioritization of national interests and programmes and a re-distribution of the 
available resources to high priority and promising areas. Nigeria runs a wasteful 
political system that spends much resource to service and maintain the different arms 
and functionaries of government. The civil service is too unwieldy and unproductive 
to justify the huge wage bill that the different tiers of government incur every month. 
It is time Nigerians and other Africans realized that politics and civil service are no 
longer avenues for sharing the so called “national cake”, and that remuneration should 
be based on productivity and relevance.  
 
Justice requires that priority funding is given to programmes that benefit the continent 
the most. Traditionally, a large percentage of budgetary allocation goes to many 
unproductive services, an example of which is defense. The defense budget in Nigeria 
and perhaps in many African countries supports a retinue of highly redundant military 
personnel some of whom are highly qualified but underutilized in productive service 
to the country. No doubt, the Nigerian military consists of a crop of young, brilliant 
and science-oriented officers that could be linked up with academic institutions in the 
country with a mandate to produce a biotechnology revolution for the country. In 
addition, it is time rich and affluent Africans were re-orientated to embrace the culture 
of supporting science and health related research. Philanthropic investments and 
endowment of chairs in biotechnology in academic institutions by well-placed and 
affluent Africans might be a better way of investing in the future of the continent. 
Besides all these, apart from the initial lump sum as take-off grants, governments 
should commit sizeable percentages of their annual budget allocations to the 
biotechnology industry. 
 
Enforcement of the rule of law  
 
The bane of most developing countries of the world is political instability and corrupt 
leadership. A stable polity and an accountable and responsive government are the 
minimum requirements for development and for attracting foreign investors. The 
present political stability in Nigeria, Ghana and many other countries of Africa 
coupled with the active involvement of their present leadership in the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), established to support economic and 
political reforms in Africa through peer review of one another’s performance, is a 
positive development for the continent. What needs to be put in place is due ethical 
and legal process for establishing and enforcing appropriate regulatory standards for 
genomics research and mechanisms for ensuring financial prudence and fiscal 
discipline. Furthermore, both the public and private sectors should collaborate in 
common biotechnology ventures. The private profit-oriented partner provides the 
fiscal and entrepreneurial discipline and thoroughness that are often lacking in 
government run programmes, while the public component regulates and controls the 
profit driven private sector interests. Also important to consider under legal 
considerations are intellectual property rights and patent issues. Developed countries 
will be reluctant to share technologies with developing countries legal systems that do 
not entrench and enforce intellectual property rights. In many African countries, 
intellectual property rights are either non-existent or are grossly violated and so patent 
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holders are reluctant to share technologies with these countries. This is a major 
impediment to realizing technology breakthrough in Africa and African governments 




Genomics and biotechnology raise many complex ethical, legal, and social concerns 
and challenges which require that national bioethics policy be instituted to guide the 
development of the biotech industry and protect the interest of the people. 
International safety and ethical standards should be adapted in the context of local 
factors such as literacy level, socio-economic conditions, cultural practices and 
religious beliefs. Capacity building in bioethics should be pursued pari passu with the 
evolution of genomics science and technology by providing training for physicians, 
nurses, other health care professionals and biological scientists. Special training is 
required for research ethics review committee members to update them with 
developments in the ethics of genomics research, handling of genomics information 
and biosafety requirements. Genetically modified food is one novel outcome of 
biotechnology with the potential to dramatically address the present food crisis in 
many African nations. It has become such a vexing issue with many political 
undertones that some African heads of governments have openly declared their 
countries’ rejection of GM food aids.27 28 More often than not, most of these 
discussions are shaped and fueled by the opinions and writings of a few vocal and 
prominent individuals and/or organizations from inside but mostly from outside 
Africa. There is dire need for empirical qualitative and quantitative research to 
document people’s perceptions and expectations about GM food and other potential 
future benefits of genomics revolution in Africa. Such research is required to provide 
basic knowledge about what the people actually want. It will also provide an 
opportunity to predict and proactively prepare for the social, cultural, religious and 




The expected benefits from the human genome project and genomics technologies are 
fascinating and hold the ace for improving the standard of living of the African 
people. However, these expectations are futuristic, time-dependent and capital 
intensive. They require commitment of national governments to policy re-orientation 
about research and development, strategic planning, resource mobilization, priority 
setting, and establishing, promoting and sustaining enabling environments for 
scientific and technological breakthrough. No doubt, there is dire need for assistance 
from the developed and the frontline developing nations in form of information flow, 
developing educational capacity and technology transfer, but great initiatives and deep 
commitments must come from within. The time to begin is now as further delay 
would worsen the already existing gaps between the high and middle income nations 
on one hand and the low income nations on the other.  
  
It should be acknowledged that biotechnology in its crude and traditional form is not 
new in Nigeria and other parts of Africa especially in some aspects of biology and 
agriculture. Moreover countries like South Africa and Egypt have advanced somewhat 
in modern biotechnology compared to others. However, there is the need to recognize 
and harness the revolutions and innovations that the knowledge of genomics has 
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brought to molecular biology and biotechnology. Though genomics may not be the 
final solution to all the problems in which the developing countries are presently 
enmeshed, it might be a decisive and positive step towards solving most of their 
present and future health problems. In the words of Samuel Katz, “difficulties that 
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Whilst in other applications of genetic technology the public debate has begun only 
when a piece of research has been completed, public consultations on biobanking 
began in 2000, before the funding for UK Biobank was even agreed, and have 
continued throughout its development. UK Biobank has obvious attractions for the 
British public. It is being set up specifically as a resource for research into common 
diseases that are relevant to everyone, rather than rare genetic disorders unknown to 
most. The only diseases mentioned on the ‘about UK Biobank’ web page are cancer, 
heart disease, diabetes and Alzheimer’s disease1.  The public are encouraged to be 
involved by the promise of ‘a better life for our children and grandchildren’ and 
‘enormous potential to result in improvements to health of the UK population’ 
through the National Health Service.2  
 
Ensuring public support 
 
Despite these selling points it was recognised by the Medical Research Council 
(MRC) and Wellcome Trust from the start, that work would have to be done to ensure 
that UK Biobank would be a success3. The early consultations indicated reasons why 
public support could not be taken for granted. There was recognition of a problem of 
trust in science and science governance in the UK with the ‘BSE crisis’ and the media 
furore over GM food following the reporting of Pusztai’s research with rats and GM 
potatoes and his concerns over GM food4.  The first public consultation on UK 
Biobank stated that genetic research had  ‘a raft of unhelpful negative associations, 
based sometimes on misinformation and mistaken assumptions’5  In contrast ‘some 
people were better informed…and tended to have a more favourable view’ 6. UK 
Biobank has taken  the view, found in many policy documents in the field of genetics, 
that transparency and openness is the key to increasing public confidence and trust 7.  
The website contains a wealth of information including on-line minutes of meetings, 
results of public and stakeholder consultations, names and biographies of committee 
members and, with a push under the Freedom of Information Act, the reviewers’ 
reports on the scientific protocol 8.   
 
So UK Biobank might be seen as a model for public involvement having 
commissioned   eight consultations with different groups between 2000 and 2003 and 
provided open access to the findings 9 .  The public were consulted through surveys, 
focus groups and a people’s panel before the plans were finalised; there were lay 
members on the committee devising the ethics and governance framework and on the 
committee devising the scientific protocol.  Different publics were consulted 
throughout the process of planning the Biobank, for example, there was a consultation 
once the Ethics and Governance framework was devised and the views of those taking 
part in the pilot project are currently being gathered (the pilot began in October 2005).   
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Tackling the ethics 
 
Many of the traditional ethical concerns about medical research were avoided 
altogether by the protocol for UK Biobank. The age group chosen does not include 
children who cannot consent, would be unlikely10 to include pregnant women or 
women planning a pregnancy, targets the currently healthy rather than vulnerable sick 
and avoids the elderly. The request to donate will be made independently of any 
treatment being received.   
 
Other ethical boxes are ticked under the arrangements for the biobank. There will be: 
 
• Voluntary participation  
• Individual consent with general information on data uses and types of research 
• Right to withdraw at any time  
• No property rights over donated sample 
• Access controlled using the existing system of research ethics committees  
• An independent Ethics and Governance Council  
• Security arrangements and assurances of confidentiality  
 
What were the public not asked about? 
 
The public were regularly consulted as the project developed in order to find out what 
would increase public interest and confidence and so ensure enough people would 
participate.  Thus, in the early stages, consultations asked about general attitudes to 
genetic research and, later on, asked people to consider technical questions about how 
samples should be collected, issues of consent and access. The public were not invited 
to consider more fundamental questions about Biobank itself, for example, the 
priorities of commercial users versus the public interest , the likelihood of benefits set 
against other possible uses of those resources, the content of regulations and who 
would be enforcing them11.  These sorts of concerns were covered by assurances that 
UK Biobank will ‘Ensure that UK Biobank is used in the public interest’, that as a 
charitable company ‘it will only be allowed to act in the public good’, that 
applications to use the samples would be subject to ethical scrutiny by research ethics 
committees and so on.  As numerous studies have already shown, the public (or rather 
the diverse ‘publics’) have expertise from their lived experience that leads them to 
raise issues that may be overlooked by scientists, policy makers and others acting in 
their capacity of ‘expert’12. For example, ‘public benefit’ may be a nice sounding 
phrase but who decides what is a public benefit, how are the public involved in the 
decisions and what happens when there are disputes about what is and is not a public 
benefit?   
 
Power of veto 
 
Power currently rests with the Board of Directors consisting of a healthcare policy 
expert, representatives of the funding bodies (Wellcome Trust, Medical Research 
Council and Department of Health), Professors of General Practice and Clinical 
Medicine and a chartered accountant. Not only are there no lay representatives, there 
are no ethicists or social scientists.  The scientific committee has twelve professors in 
epidemiology, public health and other areas of medicine, an ex-nurse, the ex-chair of 
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an NHS Trust and a professor of social policy.  The Ethics and Governance 
Committee includes a marketing consultant, two people involved in consumer/patient 
interests, a barrister, a medical doctor, a professor of pharmacology and three ethical 
experts. This committee has been set up to safeguard donors and the public in general 
by reviewing the users of data and the types of research that are proposed.  However, 
it is not the Ethics and Governance Committee that has the power of veto over the use 
of data or samples.  This power belongs to the Board of Directors. A member of the 
scientific committee sits on the Board of Directors but there is no member from the 
Ethics and Governance Committee.  This does not fulfil the promise in the 
Government White Paper (2003) that that there would be an ‘independent monitoring 
body’ with the power of veto i.e. presumably it was intended that such a body would 
be independent of the funding bodies 13. 
 
If the Ethics and Governance Committee feels that a particular application is not in 
the public interest, or is unethical for any other reason, they can report publicly on 
their views.  If they raise concerns and are not satisfied with the response from the 
Board of Directors they could resign.  Given the acknowledgement in early 
UKBiobank consultations of the influence of the media in the field of genetics, this 
seems an unwise limitation. If the committee did ‘go public’ no doubt there would be 
extensive media coverage and a subsequent effect on recruitment/retention of donors.   
 
Upstream but powerless to control the flow or dam the waters! 
 
‘Upstream’ public engagement involves the public at all stages of scientific innovation 
and involves them in the direction of policy rather than simply inviting them to 
comment on existing arrangements 14.  In UK Biobank the public were involved 
‘upstream’ in the sense of being involved early on in the project’s progress but were 
not asked about the direction of the stream or its final destination.  There was 
‘upstream’ ethics engagement too, involving bioethicists, social scientists and other 
non-scientists whose task was to anticipate the boulders and other obstacles and 
smooth the flow of the stream. They are not able to control the direction of the river or 
to dam it if they feel it should be stopped.  Both public and ethicists have played a part 
in smoothing the path of the stream but, under current plans, control lies elsewhere.   
 
                                                 
1 http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about.php).   
2 Press release, 2002, UK Biobank website http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_WTD002895.html    
3 Funding for the UK Biobank comes from the Medical Research Council; which is in funded by the 
UK Government; the Wellcome Trust which is a medical research charity, the Department of Health 
and the Scottish Executive.  
4 Horton R. (1999) Commentary: Genetically modified foods: ‘absurd’ concern or welcome dialogue?  
Lancet  354: 1315 
Lancet  (1999) Editorial:Health risks of genetically modified foods.  Lancet 353:1811 
5 MRC/Wellcome Trust (2000) Public perceptions of the collection of human biological samples. 
Qualitative research to explore public perceptions of human biological samples Report prepared by 
Cragg Ross Dawson for the Wellcome Trust and Medical Research Council p.25f 
6 ibid 
7 Jones M. and Salter B. (2003) The governance of human genetics: policy discourse and constructions 
of public trust.  New Genetics and Society 22:1 pp.21-41. 
8  See http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk 
9 http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/ethics/consultations.php 
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10 Although the age range for participation has now been widened to 40-69 (from 45-69).  
11 All these sorts of concerns were raised in focus groups held with the general public (mixed age, sex, 
social background) discussing perceptions of privacy and trust in relation to personal medical and 
genetic data see Levitt M. and Weldon S. (2005) ‘A well placed trust? Public perceptions of the 
governance of DNA databases’  Critical Public Health 15:4   
12  For a summary of purpose, methods and activities see Sue Weldon (2004) Public engagement in 
genetics: a review of current practice in the UK http://www.cesagen.lancs.ac.uk/resources/papers.htm      




The full paragraph reads ‘An independent monitoring body will also be established to ensure that 
samples of genetic material are taken with the fully informed consent of the participants and that 
procedures to protect confidentiality are strictly adhered to. This body will have the power to veto uses 
of the data or samples that it considers to be against the interests of the participants or likely to damage 
the reputation of the study’.(para 5.37) 
14 Wilsden and Willis (2004) See-through Science. Why public engagement needs to move upstream.  
London: Demos 
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Postgraduate Forum on Genetics and Society:  
Report on the Ninth Colloquium. 
 
ANDREW BARTLETT, JAMIE LEWIS & INGRID HOLME 
 
Initiated in 1998, the Postgraduate Forum on Genetics and Society (PFGS) provides a 
common forum for early-career academics from a variety of different fields, including 
sociology, psychology, law and philosophy, to engage with each other in productive 
dialogue.  The annual PFGS Colloquium has a tradition of enabling those with 
interests in genetics and society to present their work to an audience of peers from a 
range of disciplines, traditions and institutions.  These gatherings promote debate and 
dissemination in a rich inter-disciplinary setting and provide opportunities for cross-
fertilisation of methods, theory and findings.  They give the next generation of 
academics the opportunity to identify emerging research themes and the chance to 
attend free workshops, on such topics as methodology and ethics, led by established 
academics. 
 
Cardiff University and CESAGen played host to the Ninth PFGS Colloquium between 
31st August and 2nd September 2005, generously funded by the Genomics Forum.  The 
title of the colloquium was ‘The Genetic Information Age’, an attempt to concisely 
articulate the central theme; a concern with the philosophical, scientific, legal and 
social implications of understanding genetic knowledge as information, or genetic 
information as knowledge.  As with the PFGS, this theme was intended to be forward 
looking, urging consideration of the possible futures of the social and scientific 
landscape that current members of the PFGS will explore in the course of their 
careers.  However, as Jon Turney argued when opening the colloquium with a keynote 
address, ‘The Genetic Information Age’ may well have already taken place. 
 
Five themes were central to the postgraduate presentations: 
 
1.  The generation of genomic and post-genomic knowledge 
2.  The engagement of genomic science and scientists with the wider community 
3.  The development, structure and maintenance of intellectual property frameworks 
4.  The international context of genomics 
5.  The ideology of genetics 
 
The generation of knowledge 
 
A number of papers addressed the issues of scientific development, labour and 
organization.  In the first session Andrew Bartlett (Cardiff University) presented a 
paper arguing that the development of ‘big’ biological science might have unintended 
effects on the generation of scientific knowledge.  His paper suggests that a lack of 
attention has been paid to the hierarchical character of laboratory life within research.  
He argued that a scientific organisation maximising ‘functional rationality’ might lead 
to dissolution of the norms of the scientific community and an alienation of the 
scientists from the knowledge they create.  In the same session, Miguel Garcia-
Sancho (Imperial College) challenged the conventional account of the development of 
molecular sequencing strategies.  He argued that the development of DNA sequencing 
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was not simply a linear progression from protein sequencing that could be accounted 
for in purely technical terms.  Garcia-Sancho argued that the development of DNA 
sequencing was directly influenced by the conceptualisation of DNA as information.  
This session gave us an image of knowledge production as an activity involving both 
the scientist as an individual, with personal norms and values, and the scientist as a 
member of a community, sharing concepts and metaphors.  
 
The issue of how ‘mutual’ concepts and metaphors are created within scientific 
communities was explored by Bart Penders (Maastricht University).  His paper 
stressed the different ‘style boundaries’ that exist between ‘wet’ scientists (biologists), 
and ‘dry’ scientists (bioinformaticians). Jamie Lewis (Cardiff University) further 
developed this issue, exploring the difference in the levels of standardisation in 
proteomics research, making reference to the Proteomics Standards Initiative, and 
between the dry and the wet laboratory, and the effects that this might have on 
knowledge production.  
 
The role played by non-humans in the production of knowledge was emphasised in 
the paper presented by Shirlene Badger (University of Cambridge).  This explored 
how, in the case of obesity, mouse models were used to directly inform research on 
children.  These papers illustrate the methodological importance of qualitative studies 
of science with regard to understanding the process of knowledge production.  This 
was articulated by Megan Clinch (London School of Economics) in a paper that called 




‘Community engagement’ is here used as to describe the wider context of genomic 
knowledge, including public and political engagement with the rhetoric of genetics 
and genomics.  Aryn Martin (Cornell University), who is in the closing stages of her 
PhD work, presented a paper that explored the concept of chimeras and mosaics.  Her 
paper argued that cells have a materiality that can escape the body and enter 
institutions of governance, kinship and healthcare.  Martin challenged the 
development of a one-to-one biographical correspondence between cells and people, 
presenting ethnographic case studies where the genetic variability of cells invokes a 
multiplication of personhood.  Here, it is not so much that the science is new but 
rather that new people are constructed. 
 
Connor Douglas (University of York) discussed the role of patients in co-constructing 
medical genetic technologies.  He argued that the key issue here is not the ontological 
question of whether genetic information is of a different kind from other kinds of 
medical knowledge, but whether patients perceive genetic information as being 
categorically distinct.  Ingrid Geesink (Cardiff University) presented a richly detailed 
paper that discussed the role of regulatory actors in shaping the technology of tissue 
engineering, with a particular emphasis on issues of risk and safety.   
 
David Larsen (University of Cambridge) presented a paper that discussed the 
biopolitics of biotechnology.  He argued that the primary interest of the British state in 
managing its citizen’s illnesses is undergoing a process of realignment.  Whereas the 
traditional model is for state intervention in the management of disease in order to 
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increase the productivity of economic activities outside of the hospital and clinic, the 
emerging model is for the state to contribute to the endogenous growth of the 
biotechnology industry and their “reflexively” spiralling markets. 
 
Intellectual property  
 
It could be argued that the notion of genetic knowledge as intellectual property is a 
consequence of a perspective that holds genetics to be primarily an informational 
science.  The key papers at the PFGS colloquium that addressed the theme of 
intellectual property were delivered in a themed session on the second day of 
colloquium.  Chris Hamilton (London School of Economics) discussed the tension 
between the promissory, progressive rhetoric of ‘bioprospecting’ and the rhetoric of 
‘biopiracy’ that stressed the inequalities of the relationships involved in 
‘bioprospecting’.  This confrontation has found a site of particular contest in the arena 
of intellectual property rights; ought living things, and/or parts of living things, be 
patented?  
 
Adam Bostanci (Exeter University) explored the arguments used by the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) to reject patent application on microbial genomes.  
He analysed the USPTO examination files relating to three applications to patent 
whole genomes.  These were not deemed to be patentable inventions, whereas genes 
and open reading frames were.  This paper raised questions of how divisions are 
drawn between the categories of invention and discovery, between an electronic 
genome sequence and its biochemical equivalent, and between a genome and a gene.  
Both these papers emphasised the changing boundaries between public and private 
agencies and raised issues surrounding responsibilities of institutional structures.  
 
Several papers addressed issues of the general property structures that have developed 
with and are utilised by genetics and genomics.  Both Larsen and Rebecca Hanlin 
(University of Edinburgh) discussed the importance of international property rights in 
modern healthcare systems.  Adele Langlois (Open University) explored the impact of 





Langlois questioned whether existing initiatives, such as a series of UNESCO 
declarations and the Global Genomics Initiative, will be able to bridge what she 
describes as the ‘genomics divide’.  She asked whether the global South will be able 
to make use of the ‘global public good’ of genomics, or will it be the case that ‘The 
Genetic Information Age’ will produce greater inequality? 
 
The international context of genetic knowledge and technology was explored by a 
number of other participants.  Matthew Harsh (University of Edinburgh) discussed the 
governance of biotechnology in Kenya and Uganda.  These nations have similar levels 
of biotechnology and similar biosafety policies.  However, discourses of openness and 
mutuality present a more transparent and participatory image of biotechnological 
governance in Uganda than the governance regime employed in Kenya, which is 
marked by discourses of closed networks, specifically the ‘Nairobi biotech mafia’.   
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Chamu Kuppuswamy (University of Sheffield) addressed the 10/90 gap in terms of 
genomics.  Following on from the Commission on Health Research for Development 
statement, in 1990, that only 10 per cent of the resources allocated for health research 
are directed to 90 per cent of the world’s health problems, Kuppuswamy asked 
whether a similar pattern will be found in the distribution of the medical fruits of 
genomic science.  She argued, illustrating her point with the case of AIDS drugs in 
South Africa, that inequities in healthcare are likely to be exacerbated by the advent of 
“The Information Age”.  Her colleague Yog Upadhyay (University of Sheffield) 
examined the North-South divide in agricultural biotechnology, arguing that the 
development of technologies shaped by the interests of the food industry of the North 
have a deleterious impact on agricultural practice and food security in the South.  
 
The second day of the colloquium saw a session devoted to Canadian perspectives on 
‘The Genetic Information Age’.  Anne Dijkstra (University of Twente) discussed the 
engagement of the wider society with genetic science, using divergent ‘publics’ as the 
object of her study rather than a homogenous ‘public’.  She compared debates on 
biotechnology and genomics in Canada with those taking place in the Netherlands.  
Grace Reid (Cardiff University) delivered a paper exploring social representation of 
cloning in Canada.  A member of the Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and 
Cultural Studies, Reid presented the results of her textual analysis of newspaper 
articles on cloning and a series of focus groups.  She discussed the framing of the 
benefits of cloning and how these are weighed against moral and ethical concerns. 
 
The ideology of genetics 
 
The final session of postgraduate presentations discussed the idea of an ‘ideology of 
genetics’.  Kean Birch (University of Glasgow/Oxford Brookes University) discussed 
the development of ideological networks within and around the life science industries 
wedded to ‘economic’ rather than ‘technical’ success.  Jane Miller (University of 
Sheffield) asked if the future of medicine was genetic.  She pointed out that 
historically, major improvements in health care have been the result of social 
programmes, and that genetics is just a small part of our health care requirements.  
Miller suggested that political enthrallment with the promises of genetic knowledge 
could have serious consequences if this entails a diversion from conventional public 
health strategies.  Kate Weiner (University of Nottingham) delivered a critique of the 
notion of geneticization, a concept that has been used across a wide range of research 
since the early 1990s.  Her paper used the work of PFGS alumni Adam Hedgecoe on 
the rhetoric of science to suggest that we need to consider how we perform and 
disseminate critical research on genetics while not playing an active role in the 
construction of ‘hype’.  Birch drolly proposed that we ought to encourage others to 




The Ninth PFGS Colloquium attracted 51 attendees over the three days, including the 
guest speakers; Jon Turney (University College London) who opened the colloquium, 
Andrew Webster (University of York) who led a research ethics workshop, Kate 
Stewart and Bruce Mason (both Cardiff University) who led a pair of themed training 
workshops on the use of internet communication in social research, and Joan Haran 
(Cardiff University) who provided an after-dinner speech on the evening of the 
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second day.  The colloquium closed with a panel discussion on the notion of ‘The 
Genetic Information Age’ involving Ian Brewis (Cardiff University), Jane Calvert 
(Exeter University), Katie Featherstone (Cardiff University) and Buddug Williams 
(Genetic Interest Group).  The key measures of the colloquium’s success however are 
the wealth and quality of the postgraduate papers that were presented.   
 
30 postgraduate papers were delivered.  While the papers discussed in this review are 
an attempt to provide a representative picture, the full set of colloquium abstracts can 
be found on the PFGS website.    
 
For further information 
 
The PFGS manages a website at http://pfgs.org/ and a bulletin board at 
http://pfgs.org/phpBB/index.php.  The website contains information on previous 
colloquia, member profiles and details of upcoming events.  The bulletin board is a 
site for direct discussion of issues of interest to researchers working in the field of 
genetics and society.  To become a member of the PFGS please visit the website or 
contact any of the authors of this paper.  Membership is free. 
 
 
Note from the Genomics, Society and Policy Editors: 
 
There will be a PFGS Special Issue of the Genomics, Society and Policy Journal 
published in December 2006, which will feature papers related to the theme of the 
Ninth PFGS Colloquium, The Genetic Information Age.  
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Andrew Bartlett is a PhD student based at CESAGen, Cardiff University. His PhD title 
is 'Accomplishing Mapping the Human Genome: Big Science and Technology'. 
Before moving into the sociology of science, Andrew gained a BSc and an MSc in 
biological sciences.  
 
Angela Davey is a Senior Project Officer in the Genomics Directorate, Department of 
Health Western Australia. Her interests include ethical issues in human genetics, familial 
cancer, newborn screening and evaluating client satisfaction with genetic counselling.  
 
Hugh Dawkins is a Senior Policy Officer in the Genomics Directorate, Department of 
Health Western Australia. His research has covered the fields of molecular and cell 
biology, parasitology and tropical disease. His current focus is on the impact of genetic 
technology on health care particularly in relation to disease screening, gene patents, 
genetic privacy and stem cell therapy.  
 
Davina French is a senior lecturer in the School of Psychology at the University of 
Western Australia. Her research interests span all aspects of patient centered health care, 
and particularly patient reported treatment satisfaction and quality of life. Her recent work 
has involved investigating aspects of quality of life in paediatric patients with diabetes, 
cystic fibrosis and muscular dystrophy. 
 
Bart Gremmen is Director of the centre for Methodological Ethics and Technology 
Assessment (META) and Associate professor in Ethics and Philosophy of Science & 
Technology at Wageningen University. He is manager of the society program of the 
Centre for BioSystems Genomics and of the Celiac Disease Consortium in the 
Netherlands. Interests include ethics of innovation and genomics in developing countries.  
 
Stefán Hjörleifsson is a general practitioner in Norway. He is currently research fellow at 
the Section for General Practice, Department of Public Health and Primary Health Care, 
University of Bergen on a project about the public debate raised by Decode genetics and 
the governance of human genetics in Iceland. His previous publications in Icelandic and 
Norwegian are on the topics of medicalisation and ethical reasoning among doctors, and 
he teaches medical ethics at the University of Iceland.  
 
Ingrid Holme is a PhD student based at Egenis, Exeter University. Her PhD title is 'Sex 
in the Genome Exploring the influence of genomic advances on the categories of female 
and male'. Ingrid also holds a Masters in Science and Technology from Amsterdam 
University and a BSc. in Biotechnology from Leeds University.  
 
Thomas Lemke is assistant professor for sociology at Wuppertal University and research 
fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt/Main. His main research interests 
include social and political theory, sociology of organization, biopolitics, social studies of 
genetic and reproductive technologies.  
 
Mairi Levitt is a deputy director of CESAGen. A sociologist, she has a long standing 
research interest in the sociology of the new genetics, including public engagement on 
science and technology and the interface between sociology and bioethics.  
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Jamie Lewis is a PhD student based at CESAGen, Cardiff University. His PhD title is 
'Computing Genomic Science: Bioinformatics and Standardisation in Proteomics'. Prior to 
beginning his doctoral programme he worked as a researcher on projects including EU 
Foresight for Transport, Destined for Success and the Rees Report.  
 
Larissa B. Neumann is an attorney with Fenwick & West LLP in California. She holds 
her Masters in Public Health from Yale University and her J.D. from Boalt Hall School of 
Law at the University of California , Berkeley.  
 
Temidayo Ogundiran is Senior Lecturer and Consultant Surgeon in the Division of 
Oncology, Department of Surgery, University of Ibadan and University College Hospital, 
Ibadan, Nigeria. A past Fogarty fellow at Joint Centre for Bioethics, University of 
Toronto, he is presently on the faculty of the West African Bioethics Training Programme, 
an NIH funded graduate programme based in the Department of Surgery, University of 
Ibadan to develop and train bioethics manpower for the West African subregion. He is 
involved in collaborative research on genetic epidemiology of cancers and cross-cultural 
studies of voluntary participation in genetic research in Nigeria and United States. His 
interests include genetics of solid tumours, genomics technologies in Africa, information 
dissemination and management in clinical practice and research, and bioethics education 
in Africa.  
 
Peter O'Leary is the Director of the Genomics Directorate, Department of Health 
Western Australia. He is a Clinical Senior Lecturer in the School of Women's and Infant's 
Health at The University of Western Australia. He is also Biochemist at the Women's and 
Children's Health Service. Interests include issues relating to ethics, genetic testing, 
familial cancer, newborn and prenatal screening and diagnosis.  
 
Edvin Schei, MD, is associate professor at the Section for General Practice, Department 
of Public Health and Primary Health Care, University of Bergen. His PhD concerned 
lifestyle changes and behavioural epidemiology. His current research interests are the 
hermeneutic and relational aspects of medicine, including clinical and cultural 
perspectives.  
 
Roger Strand is professor and research director at the Centre for the Study of the 
Sciences and the Humanities, University of Bergen, Norway, visiting researcher at the 
Centre for Medical Ethics, University of Oslo, Norway, and visiting professor, Institute of 
Environmental Science and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain. His 
original background being a PhD in biochemistry, his current research is related to the 
philosophy of biochemistry, biology, medicine and environmental science, with a special 
interest in scientific and policy-related implications of uncertainty and complexity.  
 
David Winickoff is Assistant Professor of Bioethics and Society at University of 
California , Berkeley. He has also taught at the J.F.K. School of Government at Harvard 
University and he holds degrees from Yale University, Cambridge University (U.K.), and 
Harvard Law School. His work focuses on the ethics, law and governance of 
biotechnology.  
